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Abstract: Precontractual liability is liability that arises out of a harmful conduct 
that occurs during the formation period of a contract.  Where the harmful 
conduct occurs during international negotiations, a conflict of laws issue arises.  
The determination of the applicable law to precontractual liability can be a 
complex and tedious task, which is why the European Legislature has provided 
a special conflict-of-law rule in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation on the 
applicable law to non-contractual obligations.  Through this provision, the 
European Legislature aims to achieve uniformity between EU Member States, 
while providing an appropriate conflicts rule.  The present essay assesses the 
European Legislature’s attempt at codification and offers a commentary of 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  It comes at a time when the Commission is 
scheduled to submit a report on the application of the Rome II Regulation to the 
European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social 
Committee.  This essay will show that the Legislature has displaced the 
traditional rules of European private international law by adopting a 
contractual connecting factor in order to determine the applicable law to a non-
contractual obligation.  Indeed, the European Legislature has, for the purposes 
of European private international law, chosen to characterize culpa in 
contrahendo as non-contractual, but has chosen to determine the applicable law 
to this non-contractual obligation on the basis of a contractual connecting 
factor.  Thus, Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation has, in fact, chosen to 
submit claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in 
negotio.  According to this provision, the applicable law to claims arising out of 
culpa in contrahendo is the law of the contract that was under negotiation.  In 
spite of its advantages, the rule provided by Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation 
lacks flexibility.  The lack of escape devices and the relative inapplicability of 
the second paragraph of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation make this rule a 
rigid one whose application cannot be displaced whenever it reaches 
inappropriate results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Precontractual liability is liability that arises out of a harmful conduct 
that occurs during the formation period of a contract.
1
  Although the effect 
 
1 On precontractual liability, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and 
Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 
221 (1987); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661 (2007); John Klein & Carla Bachechi, Precontractual 
Liability and the Duty of Good Faith Negotiation in International Transactions, 17 HOUS. J. 
INT‘L L. 1 (1994); Nadia E. Nedzel, A Comparative Study of Good Faith, Fair Dealing, and 
Precontractual Liability, 12 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 97 (1997); Raymond Saleilles, De la 
responsabilité précontractuelle, 6 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. TRIM. DR. 
CIV.] 697 (1907); Joanna Schmidt, La sanction de la faute précontractuelle, 73 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. TRIM. DR. CIV.] 46 (1974); PRECONTRACTUAL 
LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, INT‘L ACAD. OF COMP. LAW, MONTREAL, 
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of the harm might be felt subsequently to the formation of the contract, the 
cause of harm is, in principle, temporally situated prior to the conclusion of 
the contract.
2
  The adjective ―precontractual‖ indicates that this type of 
liability is linked to the period that precedes the formation of the contract. 
Where the harmful conduct occurs during the international 
negotiations of a contract, a conflict of laws issue arises.  This is the case, 
for example, in the following four situations. 
Example 1: Defendant, a U.S. resident, sells his shares in a French 
company to a French plaintiff.  The defendant fails, at the time the contract 
for the sale of shares is concluded, to disclose to the French plaintiff that the 
company will stop doing business in the United States.  The plaintiff files a 
suit for damages in France for breach of the precontractual duty to disclose 
material facts during the conclusion of the contract.  This claim raises the 
issue of determining the law that governs the defendant‘s liability.  
According to French law,
3
 the defendant is liable for failure to disclose 
material facts that affect the determination of the shares‘ value.
4
  On the 
other hand, according to U.S. law,
5
 the principle of caveat emptor will most 
likely apply and exonerate the defendant.
6
 
Example 2: Defendant, a German resident, offers to buy all the shares 
of a French plaintiff in an English company.  Before a reasonable time has 
elapsed, the defendant revokes his offer in a letter dispatched in Germany 
and received in France, where the plaintiff resides.  The latter disregards the 
revocation letter and dispatches his acceptance to the defendant.  Having 
not received an answer, the plaintiff files a suit where he seeks, first to 
establish the existence of the contract by claiming that he has accepted the 
offer within a reasonable time, and, alternatively, to obtain damages for 
unlawful revocation of a binding offer.  This case raises two conflict-of-
laws issues: the issue of the existence of the contract and the issue of the 




CANADA 18–24 AUGUST, 1990 (Ewoud H. Hondius, ed.,  1991) [hereinafter 
PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS]. 
2 However, we will see that one exceptional situation gives rise to precontractual liability 
that stems from a harmful conduct that occurs after the negotiations have ended.  See infra 
Part I(B)(2)(b). 
3 France is the place of residence of the plaintiff. It is also the place where the company 
whose shares are the subject matter of the contract is situated. It might also be argued that 
this is the place where the injury has manifested itself. 
4 See FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL, LES OBLIGATIONS 233 (2009). 
5 The U.S. is the place of residence of the defendant.  It might also be argued that this is 
the place where the harmful conduct has manifested itself. 
6 See ANDREW STILTON, SALE OF SHARES AND BUSINESSES: LAW, PRACTICE & 
AGREEMENTS 133 (2d ed. 2006). 
7 Germany is the place of residence of the defendant. It might also be argued that it is the 
place where the conduct occurs, since it is the place where the decision to revoke the offer 
was made. 
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defendant is bound by his offer and cannot freely revoke it before a 
reasonable time has passed.
8
  In effect, the plaintiff has effectively accepted 
the offer and the contract for the sale of shares is formed.  Because the 
defendant is bound by the sale contract, he does not incur any 
precontractual liability under German rules.  According to French law,
9
 the 
defendant must hold the offer for a reasonable time before he can retract 
it.
10
  However, under French law the revocation of the offer prevents the 
contract from coming into existence and the defendant‘s conduct can only 
give rise to damages.
11
  Finally, according to U.K.
12
 law, the defendant can, 
in principle, freely revoke his offer without incurring liability.
13
 
Example 3: Plaintiff, a French resident, started negotiations with a 
U.K. defendant for the sale of goods by the French party to the U.K. party.  
After several weeks of negotiations, the U.K. party abruptly breaks off 
negotiations.  Having incurred costs during the negotiations period, the 
French party files a claim against the U.K. party in France in order to get 
compensated for his expenses.  The issue is whether French law,
14
 which 
awards damages in the event negotiations are broken off in bad faith,15 
should apply or whether U.K. law, which does not impose a precontractual 
 
8 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] 42, as amended, § 145 (Ger.) and § 147(2). 
9 France is the place of residence of the plaintiff. . It is also, arguably, the place where 
economic injury arise. It might also be argued that is the place where the conduct occurs, 
since the decision to revoke the offer is received there. 
10 See, e.g., Cass. 3e civ., June 4, 2009, Bull. civ. III, No. 118, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITE
XT000020656565&fastReqId=523728088&fastPos=1. 
11 The French position on the matter is not very clear. While many authors argue for the 
forced conclusion of the contract whenever the offer was prematurely retracted, the French 
Cour de Cassation has only awarded damages on the basis of the unlawful revocation of the 
offer, and has yet to force the conclusion of the contract whenever the plaintiff has accepted 
the offer after its revocation. On the French position, see TERRÉ ET AL, supra note 4, at 117; 
Patrick Chauvel, Consentement, D. 2007, ¶ 135; YVAINE BUFFELAN-LANORE & VIRGINIE 
LARRIBAU-TERNEYRE, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 745 (12th ed., 2010). On liability 
arising out of  the revocation of the offer in Europe, see Catherine Delforge, La formation 
des contrats sous un angle dynamique—Réflexions comparatives, in LE PROCESSUS DE 
FORMATION DU CONTRAT: CONTRIBUTIONS COMPARATIVES ET INTERDISCIPLINAIRES À 
L‘HARMONISATION DU DROIT EUROPÉEN 139 (Marcel Fontaine, ed. 2002). 
12 The U.K. is the place where the company whose shares are the subject matter of the 
contemplated contract is situated. 
13 Under U.K. law, the offer is not binding unless it is contained in an option contract.  
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir, 
trans., 1998). 
14 France is the place of residence of the plaintiff, and, arguably the place where 
economic injury arises.  It might also be argued that it is the place where the harmful conduct 
occurs, since the decision to break off negotiations is received in France. 
15 See Chambre commerciale et financière [Cass. Com.] [Commercial and financial 
court], Apr. 22 1997, D. 1998, 45, note Patrick Chauvel (Fr.). 
Culpa in Contrahendo in European Private International Law 
32:451 (2012) 
455 
duty of good faith during negotiations,
16
 should govern the situation, thus 
exonerating the defendant from liability. 
Example 4: Plaintiff, a U.K. resident, started negotiations with an U.S. 
defendant for the sale of land owned by the U.S. defendant in Germany.  
After several weeks of negotiations, the American party abruptly breaks off 
negotiations in a letter dispatched in the United States and received in the 
U.K.  Having incurred costs during the negotiations period, the U.K. party 
files a claim against the U.S. party in the U.K. in order to receive 
compensation for his expenses.  This claim raises the issue of the 
determination of the law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual 
liability.  According to German law,
17
 the plaintiff is entitled to damages in 
the event negotiations are broken off in bad faith.
18





 laws do not, in principle, impose a precontractual duty of good faith 
during negotiations,
21
 thereby exonerating the defendant from liability. 
The determination of the law that governs the defendant‘s 
precontractual liability in each of the above-mentioned scenarios encounters 
two difficulties.  First, the determination of the applicable law to 
precontractual liability is hindered by the difficulty of characterizing this 
type of liability.  Indeed, precontractual liability is subject to several 
possible characterizations in the different E.U. Member States.
22
  While it 
 
16 Stathis Banakas, Liability for Contractual Negotiations in English Law: Looking for 
the Litmus Test, INDRET 1 (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.indret.com/pdf/605_en_1.pdf; 
Alberto M. Musy, The Good Faith Principle in Contract Law and the Precontractual Duty 
to Disclose: Comparative Analysis of New Differences in Legal Cultures, 1 GLOBAL JURIST 
ADVANCES 1, 1, 10 (2001). 
17 Germany is the place where the property is situated. 
18 See Musy, supra note 16, at 5. 
19 The U.S. is the place of residence of the defendant.  It might also be argued that it is 
the place where the conduct occurs, since the decision to break off negotiations is made and 
dispatched to the plaintiff from the U.S. 
20 The U.K. is the place of residence of the plaintiff.  It is also, arguably the place where 
economic injury arises.  It might also be argued that it is the place where the harmful conduct 
occurs, since the decision to break off negotiations is received in the U.K. 
21 For American Law, see Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redev. Auth., 427 Mass. 
509, 517 (1998); F.D.I.C. v. LeBlanc, 85 F.3d 815 (1st Cir. 1996); see also STEVEN J. 
BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, 
BREACH, ENFORCEMENT 330 (1995) (stating that ―American law imposes no general duty to 
negotiate a contract in good faith‖).  For U.K. law, see Banakas, supra note 16, at 1; Musy, 
supra note 16; Raphael Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 16, 38 
(1956). 
22 RICHARD PLENDER & MICHAEL WILDERSPIN, THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 730 (3d ed. 2009).  On the various possible characterizations of 
precontractual liability in Europe, see  Dário Moura Vicente, Precontractual Liability in 
Private International Law: A Potuguese Perspective, 67 Rabels Zeitschrift Für 
Ausländisches Und Internationales Privatrecht [Rabel Journal for Foreign and International 
Private Law] [RabelZ] 699, 710–16 (2003); Nedzel, supra note 1, at 97; Ioanna Thoma, 
Culpa in Contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation, 61 REVUE HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INT‘L 
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has been characterized as contractual by some jurisdictions,
23
 it has been 
characterized as tortious,
24
 or even ―as an independent kind of liability 
deriving its force and effect from the law‖
25
 by others.  Some jurisdictions, 
such as Portugal, even adopt a hybrid characterization where, in some 
instances, precontractual liability can be characterized as contractual while 
in others it can be considered as tortious.
26
  The uncertainty accompanying 
the characterization of precontractual liability hinders uniformity by 
producing divergent results depending on which characterization is adopted.  
Because characterization determines the conflict-of-law rule that designates 
the applicable law,
27
 the divergent characterizations of precontractual 
liability lead to the application of divergent laws in the different Member 
States.  This would be the case, for example, in the scenario described by D. 
Moura Vicente, where ―negotiations for the conclusion of a sale contract 
break down in France and the prospective seller is a German resident.‖
28
  In 
this case, ―French and German law would potentially apply to the 
precontractual liability arising from these facts.‖
29
  Indeed, the situation is 
characterized as tortious in France, which means that the application of the 
French conflict-of-law rule designates French law as the applicable lex 
delicti.30  However, because the situation is characterized as contractual in 
Germany, the application of the German conflict-of-law rule leads to the 
application of German law to the defendant‘s precontractual liability.
31
  ―A 
concurrence of applicable rules would thus occur,‖
32
 leading to divergent 
results in the different member states. 
Second, the determination of the applicable law to precontractual 
liability is hindered by the difficulty of determining the relevant contacts in 
a situation involving precontractual liability.
33
  This is especially true for 
the place of injury, the place of conduct, the place where the parties‘ 
 
[R.H.D.I.] 669, 674 (2008); PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH 
CONGRESS, supra note 1. 
23 PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 12. 
24 This is the case, for example, in France.  See Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46; 
PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 11. 
25 This is the case, for example, in Greece.  See Thoma, supra note 25, at 674. 
26 See Moura Vicente, supra note 22, at 716. 
27 On the issue of characterization, see Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification, 
Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 
(1941); Fowler V. Harper, Torts, Contracts, Property, Status, Characterization, and the 
Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 440 (1959). 
28 Moura Vicente, supra note 22, at 716. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.; see also, Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46. 
31 Moura Vicente, supra note 22, at 716. 
32 Id. 
33 On these difficulties, see Paul Lagarde, La culpa in contrahendo à la croisée des 
règlements communautaires, in NEW INSTRUMENTS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, LIBER 
FAUSTO POCAR 584, 590 (Giuffré 2009). 
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precontractual relationship was centered, and the place where the parties‘ 
contemplated contractual relationship is centered. 
 The determination of the place of injury is complicated by the 
economic nature of the loss that arises out of the defendant‘s conduct.
34
 
 The place where the harmful conduct occurred is hard to determine 
because of the type of conduct that causes injury, and because negotiations 
are usually conducted in the absence of the physical presence of the parties.  
This is the case, for example, whenever liability arises out of a decision to 
break off negotiations that is made and dispatched by the defendant in one 
place and received by the plaintiff in another.
35
 
 The place where the parties‘ precontractual relationship is centered is 
hard to determine whenever negotiations are conducted in the absence of 
the physical presence of the parties—through the telephone or via email.
36
 
 The determination of the place where the parties‘ contemplated 
contractual relationship is centered can be hard to determine whenever 
negotiations did not lead to the conclusion of the contract.  In this case, the 
place where the contract under negotiation would have been concluded and 
the place where the contract under negotiation would have been performed 
can be hard to determine. 
The difficulties accompanying the determination of the law that 
governs precontractual liability have prompted the European Legislature to 
adopt a special conflict-of-law rule in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation 
on the applicable law to non-contractual obligations.
37
  This Regulation 
falls in line with the European Union‘s movement of unifying European 
private international law.  Along with the Rome I Regulation on the 
applicable law to contractual obligations,
38
 the European Union seeks to 
achieve uniformity in the realm of private international law of obligations 
amongst the Member States.  While the Rome I Regulation determines the 
applicable law to contractual obligations, the Rome II Regulation provides 
the applicable law to claims involving non-contractual obligations. 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation on the applicable law to non-
contractual obligations provides the choice of law rule dealing with culpa in 
contrahendo,39 which is the category that encompasses non-contractual 
 
34 See infra Part II(A)(2)(b)(i)(1)(ii). 
35 See infra Part II(A)(2)(b)(i)(1)(i). 
36 See infra Part II(A)(2)(b)(i)(1)(iii). 
37 Council Regulation 864/2007, art. 12, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 45 (EU). 
38 Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EU). 
39 The notion of culpa in contrahendo was first used by German scholar Rudolf von 
Jhering to designate fault during the conclusion of a contract. See Rudolf Von Jhering, De la 
culpa in contrahendo ou des dommages intérêts dans les conventions nulles ou restées 
imparfaites, in ŒUVRES CHOISIES VOL. II  1 (O. de Meulenaere, trans., 1893). 
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types of precontractual liability. We will see that the concept of culpa in 
contrahendo, within the meaning of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation, 
is narrower than the concept of precontractual liability.  While the latter 
encompasses a wide array of cases involving liability that arises out of a 
party‘s conduct during the negotiation of a contract,
40
 the former only 




By its placement under Chapter III of the Rome II Regulation, Article 
12 has inherited the Regulation‘s three main features.  First, this provision 
is binding in all member countries ―without the need for implementing 
national legislation in each individual country.‖
42
  In other words, its 
application is mandatory in all member countries.
43
 
Second, this provision benefits from universal applicability, which 
means two things.  First, its application ―is not dependent on any link with 
the European Community or any of the Member States, [aside] from the 
situation being litigated before a court of one of the Member States.‖
44
  
Second, it is applicable even though the designated law might not be the 
law of a Member State.  According to Article 3 of the Rome II Regulation, 
―[a]ny law specified by this Regulation shall apply whether or not it is the 
law of a Member State.‖
45
  It follows that the Regulation will cover 
situations ―occurring both within and outside the Union, which may lead to 
the application of the law of a non-Member State.‖
46
  Third, the concepts 
used by Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation have an autonomous meaning 
that is to be interpreted consistently with other EU instruments and with 
ECJ case law.
47
  This autonomy ―is essential to ensure the consistent 




40 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra Part I(B). 
42 Symeon C. Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity, 56 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 173, 174 (2008). 
43 According to the closing sentence of the Rome II Regulation: ―[t]his Regulation shall 
be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the 
Treaty establishing the European Community.‖  Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 
37, closing sentence. 
44 PLENDER &  WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 465.  However, it should be noted that the 
fact that the case is being litigated in a Member State means that the situation has at least 
some connection with the European Community. 
45 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 3. 
46 Symeonides, supra note 42, at 174. 
47 See infra Part I(B). 
48 ANDREW DICKINSON, THE ROME II REGULATION: THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 120 (2010).  See also  Cyril Nourissat, Le champ d’application 
du règlement « Rome II », in LE RÈGLEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE « ROME II » SUR LA LOI 
APPLICABLE AUX OBLIGATIONS NON CONTRACTUELLES 19 (Sabine Corneloup & Natalie 
Joubert eds., 2008) [hereinafter LE RÈGLEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE « ROME II »]. 
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The first suggestion of a conflict-of-law rule for claims arising out of 
precontractual dealings came from an informal group of private 
international law experts: the European Group of Private International Law 
(EGPIL).
50
  This idea was initially suggested in the explanatory documents 
of the Group‘s proposal for a European Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Non-Contractual Obligations adopted at the Group‘s meeting in 1998.
51
  
This initial suggestion was followed by the Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign Private and Private International Law‘s proposal to include a 
conflict-of-law rule for claims arising out of precontractual liability in its 
Comments on the European Commission‘s Green Paper on the conversion 
of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations.
52
  In July 2003, the Commission provided its first draft 
proposal for the Rome II Regulation where culpa in contrahendo appeared 
―as an example of non-contractual, [but] non-delictual instances.‖
53
  It was 
subsequently ignored in the Commission‘s modified proposal
54
 until it 
resurfaced again in the text of the Common Position,
55
 and was adopted by 
the Council in 2006.
56
  Finally, the conflict-of-law rule on culpa in 
contrahendo was adopted in Article 12 of  Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
 
49 For more on this issue, see Thoma, supra note 22, at 670; Bart Volders, Culpa in 
Contrahendo in the Conflict of Laws: A Commentary on Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation, 9 Y.B. PRIVATE INT‘L L. 127, 129 (2007) [hereinafter Volders, Commentary]; 
Bart Volders, Culpa in Contrahendo in the Conflict of Laws: A First Appraisal of Article 12 
of the Rome II Regulation, 2008.4 NEDERLANDS INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT 464, 465 
(2008) [hereinafter Volders, First Appraisal]. 
50 Thoma, supra note 22, at 669–70, Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 465. 
51 Thoma, supra note 22, at 669; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 465.  For the 
text of this proposal, see Proposal for a European Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Non-contractual Obligations, EUROPEAN GROUP FOR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
http://www.gedip-egpil.eu/documents/gedip-documents-8pe.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
52 Thoma, supra note 22, at 669–70; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 465; see 
also J. BASEDOW ET AL., MAX PLANCK INST. FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE AND PRIVATE INTL. LAW, 
COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION‘S GREEN PAPER ON THE CONVERSION OF THE 
ROME CONVENTION OF 1980 ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS INTO A 
COMMUNITY INSTRUMENT AND ITS MODERNIZATION 96, 105, 114  (2003) [hereinafter MAX 
PLANCK INST., COMMENTS], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/ 
rome_i/contributions/max_planck_institute_foreign_private_international_law_en.pdf.  In 
particular, Article 8.2 of the Proposal which states that ―[l]egal consequences resulting from 
the breaking-off of negotiations shall be governed by the law which would govern the 
contemplated contract.‖  Id. at 114. 
53 Thoma, supra note 22, at 669–70. 
54 Id. 
55 The Common Position is a legal instrument by which the Council defines the Union‘s 
approach to a particular matter. 
56 See Council Common Position 22/2006 2006 O.J. (C 289E) 68 (EC). 
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applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).
57
  Pursuant to Article 
32,
58
 the Rome II Regulation went into effect on January 11, 2009, with the 
consequence that the Regulation will apply ―only to events giving rise to 
damage [occurring after that date] and that the date on which the 
proceedings seeking compensation for damage were brought or the date on 
which the applicable law was determined by the court seised have no 
bearing on determining the scope ratione temporis of the Regulation.‖59 
B.  Structure Of The Provision 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation provides a special rule that 
determines the applicable law to culpa in contrahendo.  The European 
Legislature has decided that the general rule provided by Article 4 of the 
Rome II Regulation
60
 in order to determine the applicable law to non-
contractual obligations is inappropriate for determining the applicable law 
to precontractual liability.
61
  The Legislature has, therefore, provided for a 
more specific rule that is more suitable in this particular case.
62
  In effect, 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation has been placed in a separate chapter 
that provides special rules for situations that encompass non-contractual 
obligations arising from unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in 
 
57 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37. 
58 Id. art. 32. 
59 Case C-412/10, Homawoo v. GMF Assurances, 2011 E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 37. 
60 Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation states: 
1.  Unless otherwise provided for in this Regulation, the law applicable to a non-
contractual obligation arising out of a tort/delict shall be the law of the country in 
which the damage occurs irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise 
to the damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in which the 
indirect consequences of that event occur. 
2.  However, where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining 
damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the 
damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply. 
3.  Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the tort/delict is 
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in 
paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.  A manifestly closer 
connection with another country might be based in particular on a preexisting 
relationship between the parties, such as a contract, that is closely connected with 
the tort/delict in question. 
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 4. 
61 According to Recital 19 of the Rome II Regulation, ―[s]pecific rules should be laid 
down for special torts/delicts where the general rule does not allow a reasonable balance to 
be struck between the interests at stake.‖  Id. at para. 19. 
62 According to Recital 29 of the Rome II Regulation, ―[p]rovision should be made for 
special rules where damage is caused by an act other than a tort/delict, such as unjust 
enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo.‖  Id. at para. 29. 




According to Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation: 
1.  The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, regardless of whether 
the contract was actually concluded or not, shall be the law that 
applies to the contract or that would have been applicable to it had it 
been entered into. 
2.  Where the law applicable cannot be determined on the basis of 
paragraph 1, it shall be: 
(a) the law of the country in which the damage occurs, 
irrespective of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred and irrespective of the country or countries in 
which the indirect consequences of that event occurred; or 
(b) where the parties have their habitual residence in the same 
country at the time when the event giving rise to the damage 
occurs, the law of that country; or 
(c) where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that 
the non-contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to 
the conclusion of a contract is manifestly more closely 
connected with a country other than that indicated in points (a) 
and (b), the law of that other country.
64
 
Close examination of this provision reveals that the European 
Legislature has, in the area of precontractual liability, chosen to depart from 
the traditional rules of private international law in Europe.  Conflicts of 
laws in Europe are traditionally resolved by relying upon a two-step process 
that requires courts to characterize the issue before implementing the 
conflict-of-law rule that designates the applicable law.  First, the courts 
must characterize the issue.  Upon characterization, the issue will be 
inserted into a private international law category (i.e. torts, contracts, 
marriage, successions, property, etc).  Second, the courts will apply the 
conflict-of-law rule that is assigned to the category to which the issue 
belongs. Each private international law category is assigned a 
predetermined connecting factor that determines the applicable law 
whenever the dispute falls within this category.  In effect, each private 
international law category has its own law whose application is triggered 
whenever the dispute falls within this category. Thus, the category of torts 
 
63 Cf. Gérard Légier, Enrichissement sans cause, gestion d’affaires et culpa in 
contrahendo, in LE RÈGLEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE « ROME II », supra note 48, at 145; 
Caroline Tubeuf, Enrichissement sans cause, gestion d’affaires et ―culpa in contrahendo,‖ 
114 REVUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL BELGE 535 (2008). 
64 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37. 
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is usually governed by the lex delicti—which, according to Article 4 of the 
Rome II Regulation, is the law of the place of injury
65
—while the category 
of ―contracts‖ is usually governed by the lex contractus—which is 
determined according to the rules provided by the Rome I Regulation.
66
 
In adopting Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation, the European 
Legislature has chosen to depart from this tradition.  Indeed, the European 
Legislature, which has opted in favor of a non-contractual characterization 
of culpa in contrahendo in European Private International Law (EPIL), has 
in fact chosen a contractual connecting factor in order to determine the 
applicable law.  Instead of choosing to submit this category to the lex 
delicti, which is the general rule applicable in cases of non-contractual 




The present essay offers a two-part commentary of Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation, and comes at a time when the Commission has 
scheduled to submit a report on the application of the Rome II Regulation to 
the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and 
Social Committee.  The submission of such a report was first provided for 
by Article 30(1) of the Rome II Regulation.  According to this provision, a 
report on the application of the Rome II Regulation was to have been 
submitted by the Commission, no later than August 2011.  The report was 
to have been accompanied, if necessary, by proposals to adapt the Rome II 
Regulation and was to include 
a study on the effects of the way in which foreign law is treated in 
the different jurisdictions and on the extent to which courts in the 
Member States apply foreign law in practice pursuant to this 
Regulation; [and] a study on the effects of Article 28 of this 
Regulation with respect to the Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on 




65 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 4. 
66 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38. 
67 Cf. Sylvain Bollée, A la croisée des règlements Rome I et Rome II: la rupture des 
négociations contractuelles, 31 D. 2008, 2161.  This author states that there is a ―union‖ 
between the two laws.  See infra Part II(A). 
68 Article 30(1) of the Rome II Regulation states that: 
1.  Not later than 20 August 2011, the Commission shall submit to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee a 
report on the application of this Regulation.  If necessary, the report shall be 
accompanied by proposals to adapt this Regulation.  The report shall include: 
(i)  a study on the effects of the way in which foreign law is treated in the 
different jurisdictions and on the extent to which courts in the Member States 
apply foreign law in practice pursuant to this Regulation; 
(ii)  a study on the effects of Article 28 of this Regulation with respect to the 
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In its Application Plan to Implement the Stockholm Programme, the 
Commission postponed the submission of this report to 2012.
69
  The present 
essay provides another look at the Legislature‘s attempt to provide a 
conflict-of-law rule in the realm of precontractual liability
70
 in the hope that 
some of the uncertainties that accompany the implementation of this rule 
will be addressed in the upcoming report. 
Part I of this essay will discuss the non-contractual characterization of 
culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation.  Through this 
characterization, the European Legislature has aimed to put an end to the 
characterization debate of precontractual liability in the different Member 
States.
71
  Part I(A) of this essay will show that the non-contractual 
characterization of culpa in contrahendo aims to achieve uniformity 
between the European instruments on Private International law, and falls in 
line with the ECJ case law on jurisdiction, as well as with the Rome I 
Regulation on the applicable law to contractual obligations.  Part I(B) of 
this essay will show that the Legislature has intended for culpa in 
contrahendo to have an autonomous meaning that is not to be necessarily 
interpreted within the meaning of national law.  Part I(B) will show that 
only certain claims arising out of precontractual dealings fall within the 
material scope of culpa in contrahendo. 
Part II of this essay will discuss the contractual connecting factor of 
culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation.  Part II(A) will discuss the 
general rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation.  This part 
will show that Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation has submitted claims 
arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the law of the contract under 
negotiation or the lex contractus in negotio.  Depending on whether the 
contract under negotiation has been concluded or not, the lex contractus in 
negotio is one of two laws.  In the first situation, the law that governs the 
concluded contract also governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability.  In 
this case, the lex contractus in negotio is the lex contractus finalis or the 
law of the definitive contract.  In the event the contract was not concluded, 
 
Hague Convention of 4 May 1971 on the law applicable to traffic accidents. 
Article 30(1) of Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12. 
69 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Delivering an 
area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens, Action Plan Implementing the 
Stockholm Programme, at 25 COM (2010) 171 final (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0171:FIN:EN:PDF. 
70 Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation was the subject of several commentaries in 
Europe, see most notably: Bollée, supra note 67; DICKINSON, supra note 48, ch. 12; Lagarde, 
supra note 33; Légier supra note 63; PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, ch. 26; Thoma, 
supra note 22; Tubeuf supra note 63; Volders, Commentary, supra note 49; Volders, First 
Appraisal, supra note 49. 
71 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 730. 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:451 (2012) 
464 
the law of the contract whose conclusion was contemplated by the parties 
during their negotiations governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability.  
In this case, the lex contractus in negotio is the lex contractus putativus or 
the law of the putative contract. Part II(A) will also offer an appraisal of the 
application of the lex contractus in negotio after pinpointing the difficulties 
that accompany the determination of the lex contractus in negotio.  These 
difficulties stem from the application of a contractual connecting factor to a 
non-contractual situation. 
Part II(B) of this essay will discuss the subsidiary connecting factors 
provided by Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation.  This part will show 
that the application requirement of Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation 
can rarely be met, thus rendering the application of Article 12(1) quasi-
exclusive. 
I.  THE NON-CONTRACTUAL CHARACTERIZATION OF CULPA IN 
CONTRAHENDO IN EPIL 
Conflicts of laws in Europe are traditionally resolved by using a two-
step process that requires courts to characterize the issue before 
implementing the conflict-of-law rule that designates the applicable law.
72
  
Characterization is, therefore, the first step that a European jurist should 
take before attempting to resolve a conflict of laws issue.
73
  Unlike the 
United States‘ pragmatic approach to conflicts,
74
 EPIL places a strong 
emphasis on characterization in order to determine the relevant contact that 
will, in turn, determine the applicable law.
75
  By adopting a special rule for 
precontractual liability, the European Legislature intended, at least for EPIL 
purposes, to put an end to the characterization debate of precontractual 
liability in Europe.
76
  This debate stems from the various categories in 
which national jurisdictions of member states include precontractual 
liability.
77
 The differences in characterization between the different member 
states ruin uniformity and might lead, in the same situation, to the 




72 See supra notes 64–66, and accompanying text. 
73 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 465. 
74 The pragmatic approach to conflict of laws is ―a method of choice-of-law analysis that 
integrates the important elements of the various modern policy-oriented approaches to 
conflicts law . . . .What is unique about the method advocated here is the insistence on 
generating arguments on both sides before reaching any conclusions about the proper 
outcome.‖  Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U.L. REV. 731, 818 
(1990). 
75 See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
76 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 730; Bollée, supra note 67; Thoma, supra 
note 22; Tubeuf, supra note 63. 
77 See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text. 
78 See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text. 
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By inserting a provision on culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II 
Regulation, the European Legislature has chosen to characterize this type of 
liability as non-contractual. 
The non-contractual characterization of culpa in contrahendo raises 
two issues. 
The first issue is to determine whether the European Legislature has 
chosen to characterize all types of precontractual liability in EPIL as non-
contractual.  According to the European Court of Justice, there are two 
types of precontractual liability in EPIL: a contractual type of 
precontractual liability and a non-contractual type of precontractual 
liability.
79
 The issue is whether the newly adopted provisions on 
precontractual liability in the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations deviate 
from the ECJ case law or if, on the contrary, these provisions fall in line 
with the ECJ case law.
80
 Part I(A) will show that the European Legislature 
has chosen to be consistent with the ECJ case law and has adopted a 
uniform characterization of culpa in contrahendo in European Private 
International Law. 
The second issue is to determine the type of claims that are 
characterized as culpa in contrahendo in order to trigger the application of 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. Part I(B) will show that the European 
Legislature has conferred upon culpa in contrahendo an autonomous 
meaning, which, according to recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation,
81
 is not 
necessarily interpreted within the meaning of national laws.
82
  This means 
that the contours of the category of culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II 
Regulation should be determined in accordance with the ECJ case law as 
well as with the regulatory provisions of the European instruments on 
private international law, and should not vary according to the national 




79 See infra Part I(A)(1). 
80 See PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 544; 
Thoma, supra note 22, at 678; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466. 
81 Recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation states 
Culpa in contrahendo for the purposes of this Regulation is an autonomous 
concept and should not necessarily be interpreted within the meaning of national 
law.  It should include the violation of the duty of disclosure and the breakdown of 
contractual negotiations.  Article 12 covers only non-contractual obligations 
presenting a direct link with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.  This 
means that if, while a contract is being negotiated, a person suffers personal injury, 
Article 4 or other relevant provisions of this Regulation should apply. 
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at para 30. 
82 DICKINSON, supra note 48 at 525; Légier, supra note 63, at 148; PLENDER & 
WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 729; Thoma, supra note 22, at 676; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 
540; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466. 
83 Thoma, supra note 22, at 676. 
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A.  The Uniform Characterization of Culpa in Contrahendo 
By inserting a provision on the applicable law to culpa in contrahendo 
in the Rome II Regulation, the European Legislature has sought to achieve 
uniformity between the sources of private international law in the European 
Union.  Indeed, the non-contractual characterization of culpa in 
contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation falls in line with the ECJ case law 
on jurisdiction, as well as with the Rome I Regulation on the applicable law 
to contractual obligations. 
1.  The ECJ Case Law on Jurisdiction 
The non-contractual characterization of precontractual liability in the 
Rome II Regulation falls in line with the ECJ case law on the Brussels 
Convention of September 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (1968 Brussels Convention).
84
  
In its Tacconi judgment of September 17, 2002,85 the ECJ has expressly 
characterized precontractual liability arising out of the unjustified breaking 
off of negotiations as a non-contractual type of liability.  In this case, the 
Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation) referred 
to the ECJ a question concerning the interpretation of Article 2,
86
 the first 
subparagraph of Article 5(1),
87
 and Article 5(3)
88
 of the 1968 Brussels 
 
84 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968 [hereinafter 1968 Brussels Convention].  This 
convention has been replaced by the Brussels I Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters.  This regulation governs the jurisdiction of courts of Member States in civil and 
commercial matters, as well as the rules governing the recognition of foreign judgments in 
member states.  Council Regulation 44/2001, 2000 O.J. (L 12/1) 1 (EC). 
85 Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v Heinrich Wagner Sinto 
Maschinenfabrik GmbH (HWS), 2002 E.C.R., I-7357, I-7396. 
86 Article 2 of the 1968 Brussels Convention states that 
subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting 
State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State. 
Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled shall be 
governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State. 
1968 Brussels Convention , supra note 84, art. 2. 
87 Article 5(1) of the Convention states that 
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be 
sued: 
1.  in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance 
of the obligation in question; in matters relating to individual contracts of 
employment, this place is that where the employee habitually carries out his 
work, or if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any one 
country, the employer may also be sued in the courts for the place where the 





  In order to determine which court had jurisdiction to settle 
the dispute, the Italian court sought to ascertain the proper characterization 
of an action in precontractual liability.
90
  The ECJ had to determine whether 
such an action fell within the scope of ―matters relating to delict or quasi-
delict‖ under Article 5(3) of the Convention
91
—which gives jurisdiction to 
the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred—or whether such 
an action fell within the scope of ―matters relating to a contract‖ under 
Article 5(1) of the Convention
92
—which gives jurisdiction to the courts of 
the place of performance of the obligation.
93
 
The ECJ chose to characterize the issue as non-contractual.  According 
to the ECJ, the claim to recover the damage allegedly caused by the 
unjustified breaking off of negotiations is in ―the absence of obligations 
freely assumed by one party towards another on the occasion of 
negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract . . .a matter relating 




The analysis of the above-mentioned holding reveals that the ECJ 
distinguishes between two types of precontractual liability.  The ECJ seems 
to distinguish between the situation where one of the parties has not freely 
assumed obligations towards the other on the occasion of the negotiation of 
a contract, and the situation where one party has freely assumed obligations 
towards another on the occasion of such negotiations.  While in the first 
instance, the defendant‘s liability is characterized as non-contractual, 
liability that arises out of the breach of a freely assumed obligation by one 
party towards another on the occasion of the negotiations with a view to the 
formation of a contract is a type of contractual liability.95  According to the 
 
business which engaged the employee was or is now situated . . . . 
Id. art. 5(1). 
88 Article 5(3) of the Convention states that: ―A person domiciled in a Contracting State 
may, in another Contracting State, be sued: . . . 3. in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-
delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.‖  Id.art.5(3). 
89 See Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner 
Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Geelhoed, 2002 E.C.R. I-
07357, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000 
C0334:EN:PDF. 
90 Id. 
91 See supra note 88. 
92 See supra note 87. 
93 See Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner 
Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Geelhoed, 2002 E.C.R. I-
07357, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62000 
C0334:EN:PDF. 
94 Id. ¶ 27. 
95 In support of this reading of the Tacconi holding, see: Volders, First Appraisal, supra 
note 49, at 465; Thoma, supra note 22, at 676; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 544. 
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Tacconi judgment, liability that arises during the negotiation period of a 
contract is a non-contractual type of liability, unless it arises out of the 
breach of a freely assumed obligation by one party towards another on the 
occasion of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract.
96
 
Contrary to what has been argued by a number of scholars,
97
  Article 
12 of the Rome II Regulation does not depart from the Tacconi judgment.  
We do not share the view that ―pursuant to the new . . . Rome I and Rome II 
Regulations, all liability claims arising out of pre-contractual relationship 
between the parties, albeit a claim arising out of a culpa in contrahendo 
within the meaning of Article 12 Rome II or not, are to be characterized as 
non-contractual.‖
98
 On the contrary, it would seem that the characterization 
of precontractual liability in the Rome I and Rome II Regulations falls in 
line with the ECJ‘s holding for the following reasons. 
First, Recital 7 of the Rome I Regulation
99
 and Recital 7 of the Rome 
II Regulation
100
 clearly state that the substantive scope and the provisions of 
each Regulation ―should be consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I).‖  It 
follows that the provisions on the applicable law to precontractual liability 
in each Regulation are to be construed in accordance with the ECJ case law 
on the matter.  In effect, the conflict-of-law rule provided by Article 12 of 
the Rome II Regulation ought to be aligned with the Tacconi judgment.101 
Second, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation determines the 
applicable law to ―non-contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior 
 
96 See infra Part I(B)(1).  For additional commentaries on the Tacconi judgment, see Jiří 
Valdhans, The Pitfall of Interpreting Rome II Regulation Consistently with Brussels I 
Regulation, 2009.2 JURISPRUDENCIJA 229 (2009); Michael Bonnel, Precontractual Liability, 
the Brussels Jurisdiction Convention and . . . the Unidroit Principles, in MÉLANGES OFFERTS 
À MARCEL FONTAINE 359 (2003); R. Libchaber, Commentaire de C.J.C.E, 17 Septembre 
2002, Tacconi, DEFRÉNOIS 254 (2003); Anne Marmisse, Jurisprudence de la CJCE relative à 
la Convention de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968 (CJCE Fonderie Officine Mecchaniche 
Tacconi Spa c/ Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH (HWS), 17 sept. 2002, aff. 
C-334-00), RTD COM. 207 (2003); Thoma, supra note 22, at 676. 
97 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 544. 
98 This view was initially expressed by Bart Volders in his article entitled Culpa in 
Contrahendo in the Conflict of Laws: A commentary on Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation, 
supra note 49, at 130.  However, in a subsequent article, the author seems to have clarified 
his position on the matter.  According to the author, ―it seems, however, fair, to presume 
that, despite the plain language of the Rome I Regulation, the European Legislature did not 
intend to infringe upon the principle of party autonomy in precontractual relations but 
instead ought to align its new conflict rules with the Tacconi judgement of the European 
Court of Justice.‖  Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466. 
99 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, para 7 (internal citations omitted). 
100 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, para 7 (internal citations omitted). 
101 In support of this view, see Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466. 
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to the conclusion of a contract.‖
102
  The wording of Article 12 of the Rome 
II Regulation suggests that there are two types of obligations at the 
negotiation stage: contractual obligations and non-contractual obligations, 
and that only the latter type of obligations are covered by Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation.  It would seem that the European Legislature has taken 
into account the existence of two types of precontractual liability in the 
realm of conflict of laws: a contractual type of precontractual liability and a 
non-contractual type of precontractual liability.  Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation determines the applicable law to the non-contractual type of 
precontractual liability. We will see that this provision determines the 
applicable law to precontractual liability that does not arise out of the 
breach of a freely assumed obligation by one party towards another on the 
occasion of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract.
103
  In 
other words, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation determines the applicable 
law to the type of precontractual liability that has been characterized as non-
contractual by the ECJ in the Tacconi judgment. 
Third, the Rome I Regulation on the applicable law to contractual 
obligations, which has expressly excluded ―obligations arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract‖ from its scope,
104
 has 
excluded such obligations only insofar as they fall within the material scope 
of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.
105
 Through this provision, the 
European Legislature did not intend to characterize all claims arising out of 
precontractual dealings as non-contractual,
106
 but only intended to preserve 
the material scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  This provision 
has only excluded from its scope culpa in contrahendo as it is defined by 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  Thus, precontractual liability that has 
been characterized as contractual by the Tacconi judgment still falls within 
the scope of the Rome I Regulation, while precontractual liability that has 
been characterized as non-contractual by the Tacconi judgment falls outside 
the scope of this Regulation.
107
 
Fourth, the ECJ has chosen to characterize certain claims arising out of 
precontractual dealings as contractual in order to take into account the 
existence of promises made by the parties at the negotiation stage.  The 
contractual characterization of such claims takes into account the right of 
the parties to freely organize their precontractual relationship.  Practically, 
the parties have the right to organize their precontractual relationship 
through the conclusion of a preliminary agreement that determines the 
rights and obligations of each party at the negotiation stage.  The 
 
102 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12. 
103 See infra Part I(B)(1). 
104 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1. 
105 See infra Part I(A)(2). 
106 Contra PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731. 
107 In support of this view, see Thoma, supra note 22, at 678. 
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contractual characterization of liability claims arising out of the breach of 
such a preliminary agreement ought to be upheld in the realm of conflict of 
laws.
108
  Such a characterization ensures that the issue of precontractual 
liability arising out of the breach of a preliminary agreement is submitted to 
the law that governs the preliminary agreement itself.  To hold otherwise 
would thwart the parties‘ expectations by submitting the plaintiff‘s claim to 
the law that is determined on the basis of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation.  In such a case, the application of the rule provided by Article 
12(1) of the Rome II Regulation to the parties‘ preliminary agreement will 
submit liability arising out of the breach of such an agreement to the law of 
the contract under negotiation.  The application of this provision would 
subject the parties‘ existing relationship under the current preliminary 
agreement to the law of their contemplated relationship.  The parties will be 
unfairly surprised by the application of the law governing another contract 
to their preliminary agreement.  This outcome is ―at square with the 
principle of party autonomy, pursuant to which the parties can not only 
freely structure and organize their contractual relationship, but also their 
precontractual dealings.‖
109
  Thus, we cannot assume that the European 
Legislature, has intended ―to infringe upon the principle of party autonomy 
in precontractual relations‖
110
 in the realm of conflict of laws. 
In effect, the Rome I and Rome II Regulations fall in line with the ECJ 
case law on jurisdiction. Indeed, whenever precontractual liability does not 
arise out of the breach of a contractual obligation concluded at the occasion 
of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract, it is characterized 
as non-contractual, and falls within the scope of the Rome II Regulation. 
Inversely, whenever precontractual liability arises out of the breach of such 
an obligation it is characterized as contractual and falls within the scope of 
the Rome I Regulation.
111
 
2.  The Rome I Regulation 
The Rome I Regulation on the applicable law to contractual 
obligations has expressly excluded ―obligations arising out of dealings prior 
to the conclusion of a contract‖ from its scope.
112
  While such obligations 
are expressly excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation, an issue 
arises as to the extent of this exclusion. 
 
108 See infra Part I(B)(1). 
109 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466. 
110 Id. 
111 In support of this view, see Thoma, supra note 22, at 678. 
112 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1. 
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a.  The Exclusion of Culpa in Contrahendo From the Scope of the Rome I 
Regulation 
It is widely acknowledged that the Rome I Regulation on the 
applicable law to contractual obligations and the Rome II Regulation on the 
applicable law to non-contractual obligations ―must be construed together 
so that the scope of each excludes the other.‖
113
  Indeed, ―every obligation 
in civil and commercial matters is either contractual or non-contractual for 
the purposes of determining the choice of law regime in EPIL, and it cannot 
be both.‖
114
  Furthermore, ―the concept of non-contractual obligations is 
residual.‖
115
  This concept is defined negatively and encompasses the 
obligations that are not contractual.
116
  It follows that obligations related to 
commercial and civil matters that are excluded from the scope of the Rome 
I Regulation on the applicable law to contractual obligations are 
characterized as non-contractual and fall, necessarily, within the scope of 
the Rome II Regulation on the applicable law to non-contractual 
obligations.
117
  This is the case of culpa in contrahendo in EPIL which has 
been expressly excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation, thereby 
falling within the scope of the Rome II Regulation.  Indeed, Article 1 of the 
Rome I Regulation has expressly excluded from its scope ―obligations 
arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract,‖
118
 while 
Recital 10 of the Rome I Regulation states that ―[o]bligations arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract are covered by Article 12 of 
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007.  Such obligations should therefore be 
excluded from the scope of this Regulation.‖
119
 
b.  The Extent of the Exclusion 
While Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation has expressly excluded 
―obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract‖ 
from its scope, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only covers ―non-
contractual obligation[s] arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a 
contract.‖
120
 The divergent wording of the Rome I and the Rome II 
Regulation gives rise to confusion regarding the characterization of 
precontractual liability in EPIL.  Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation gives 
 
113 Andrew Scott, The Scope of Non-Contractual Obligations, in THE ROME II 
REGULATION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION REGIME 61 (John Ahern & William Binchy eds., 2009); 
DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 3.104. 
114 Scott, supra note 113, at 59. 
115 Id. at 61; see also Lagarde, supra note 33, at 585. 
116 Scott, supra note 113, at 61. 
117 DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 3.104. 
118 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1. 
119 Id. at para. 10. 
120 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art 12(1) (emphasis added). 
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rise to two possible interpretations. 
According to the first interpretation, Article 1 of the Rome I 
Regulation has excluded from its scope all liability claims arising out of 
precontractual dealings.  In effect, ―all liability claims arising out of a 
precontractual relationship between the parties, albeit a claim arising out of 
a culpa in contrahendo within the meaning of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation or not, are to be characterized as non-contractual.‖
121
  This 
interpretation has the merit of ensuring uniformity of characterization since 
it characterizes all types of precontractual liability as non-contractual.  
However, it is at odds with the ECJ case-law on jurisdiction,
122
 as well as 
with the principle of party autonomy, which allows the parties to organize 




According to the second interpretation, Article 1 of the Rome I 
Regulation has excluded obligations arising out of dealings prior to the 
conclusion of a contract only insofar as they fall within the material scope 
of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.
124
  In effect, the Rome I Regulation 
has only excluded from its scope non-contractual obligations arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.  However, contractual 
liability claims arising out of a precontractual relationship fall within the 
scope of the Rome I Regulation.  While this interpretation reintroduces 
diversity where the Legislature has aimed to ensure uniformity, we believe 
it to be exact for two reasons.  First, Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation 
only excludes from the scope of the Rome I Regulation ―obligations arising 
out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.‖125  It follows that 
liability claims arising out of the breach of contractual obligations that 
derive from a contract that is concluded in anticipation of the ultimate 
agreement, such as obligations arising out of a preliminary agreement
126
, do 
not fall within the scope of the exclusion of Article 1 of the Rome I 
Regulation.
127
  Second, Recital 10 of the Rome I Regulation states that 
―[o]bligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract 
are covered by Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007.  Such 
obligations should therefore be excluded from the scope of this 
 
121 This view was expressed by B. Volders in a first article entitled Culpa in Contrahendo 
in the Conflict of Laws: A commentary on Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  See 
Volders, Commentary, supra note 49, at 130.  The author has clarified his position in a 
subsequent article.  See supra note 98.  In support of this view, see PLENDER AND 
WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731. 
122 See supra Part I(A)(1). 
123 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466. 
124 See Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163. 
125 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1. 
126 For a list of contractual obligations that are concluded at the precontractual stage see 
infra Part I(B)(1)(b). 
127 Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163. 





  This Recital implies that Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation 
only intended to preserve the material scope of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation, by excluding from the scope of the Rome I Regulation claims 
of precontractual liability that are covered by Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation.  In other words, we have to determine the contours of the 
category of culpa in contrahendo as it is defined by Article 12 of the Rome 
II Regulation in order to determine which claims fall outside the scope of 
the Rome I Regulation. 
B.  The Autonomous Characterization of Culpa in Contrahendo 
Recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation has conferred upon the concept 
of culpa in contrahendo an autonomous meaning that is not necessarily 
interpreted within the meaning of national law.  According to Recital 30 of 
the Rome II Regulation, 
[c]ulpa in contrahendo for the purposes of this Regulation is an 
autonomous concept and should not necessarily be interpreted within 
the meaning of national law.  It should include the violation of the 
duty of disclosure and the breakdown of contractual negotiations.  
Article 12 covers only non-contractual obligations presenting a direct 
link with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.  This 
means that if, while a contract is being negotiated, a person suffers 
personal injury, Article 4 or other relevant provisions of this 
Regulation should apply.‖
129 
The autonomous meaning conferred upon culpa in contrahendo raises 
the issue of the substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  
In order to determine which matters fall within the scope of this article, we 
must determine the contours of the category of culpa in contrahendo in the 
Rome II Regulation. 
Three guidelines must be followed in order to determine the 
substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation: (1)  The 
substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation must be 
determined in accordance with the ECJ case law on jurisdiction as well as 
with the regulatory provisions of the European instruments on Private 
International law.
130
  (2)  The substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation must be construed in accordance with the substantive scope of 
 
128 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, at para 10. 
129 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at para. 30. 
130 According to Recital 7 of the Rome II Regulation, ―[t]he substantive scope and the 
provisions of this Regulation should be consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (5) (Brussels I) and the instruments dealing with the law 
applicable to contractual obligations.‖ Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at 
Recital 7. 
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the Rome I Regulation so that the scope of each regulation excludes the 
other.  In effect, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only encompasses 
precontractual liability that has been excluded by the Rome I Regulation. 
(3)  The substantive scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation must be 
determined in accordance with the guideline provided by Recital 30 of the 
Rome II Regulation. 
The analysis of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation in light of the 
above-mentioned guidelines reveals that this provision does not cover all 
types of precontractual liability.  The scope of this provision is limited to 
the following matters: (1) Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only covers 
―non-contractual obligations;‖
131
 and (2) Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation only covers non-contractual obligations that present a direct link 
with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract. 
1.  Culpa in Contrahendo Does Not Encompass the Breach of Contractual 
Obligations Concluded at the Occasion of Negotiations With a View to The 
Formation of a Contract 
The wording of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation suggests that 
there are two types of obligations that arise at the negotiation stage: 
contractual obligations, and non-contractual obligations.  Accordingly, 
there are two types of precontractual liability in EPIL: a contractual type of 
precontractual liability that arises out of the breach of a contractual 
obligation, and a non-contractual type of precontractual liability that does 
not arise out of the breach of a contractual obligation.  Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation only covers the latter type of precontractual liability.
132
 
Four reasons justify the exclusion of precontractual liability arising out 
of the breach of contractual obligations from the scope of Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation. 
First, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation determines the applicable 
law to ―non-contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior to the 
conclusion of a contract.‖
133 
 The wording of this Article suggests that 
contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of negotiations with a 
view to the formation of an ultimate agreement have been expressly 
excluded from its scope. 
Second, Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation has excluded ―obligations 
arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract,‖
134
 only insofar 
as they fall within the material scope of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation.
135
 The Rome I Regulation has only excluded from its scope 
 
131 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37. 
132 See Thoma, supra note 22, at 678. 
133 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37. 
134 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1(2)(i). 
135 See supra Part I(A)(2)(b). 
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non-contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of 
a contract.  This Regulation determines the applicable law to claims arising 
out of the breach of contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of 
negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a contract. 
Third, the application of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation to 
contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of negotiations with a 
view to the conclusion of a contract will thwart the parties‘ expectations 
regarding the applicable law.  This is especially true whenever the parties 
have entered into a preliminary agreement that organizes their negotiations.  
In such a case, the application of the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the 
Rome II Regulation to the parties‘ preliminary agreement will submit 
liability arising out of the breach of such an agreement to the law of the 
contract under negotiation.  The application of this provision would subject 
the parties‘ existing relationship under the current preliminary agreement to 
the law of their contemplated relationship, which would deprive them of the 
right to rely on the law that governs their preliminary agreement. 
Fourth, contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of 
negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a contract must be excluded 
from the scope of the Rome II Regulation in order to grant the parties, who 
are not pursuing a commercial activity, the freedom to choose the law that 
governs their preliminary agreements. Contrary to obligations that fall 
within the scope of the Rome I Regulation, obligations that fall within the 
scope of the Rome II Regulation are governed by the law that is chosen by 
the parties, who are not pursuing a commercial activity, only when this 
choice is made after the event giving rise to the damage occurred.  By 
submitting preliminary agreements to the rules provided by the Rome II 
Regulation, we preclude the parties, who are not pursuing a commercial 
activity, from choosing the applicable law to their preliminary agreement.  
In effect, a choice of law clause that is inserted in a preliminary agreement, 
concluded between parties who are not pursuing a commercial activity, 
becomes inefficient. Such a limitation on party choice is inadmissible 
whenever the parties have chosen to organize their precontractual 
relationship by entering into a preliminary agreement. Therefore, 
contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of negotiations with a 
view to the conclusion of a contract must be excluded from the scope of the 
Rome II Regulation. Such obligations are governed by the rules provided 
by the Rome I Regulation which allow all parties to choose the applicable 
law without any restrictions. 
Thus, contractual obligations concluded at the occasion of negotiations 
with a view to the formation of an ultimate agreement ought to be excluded 
from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  However, the 
concepts of contractual and non-contractual obligations have yet to be 
defined in the realm of conflict of laws in EPIL: the European Legislature 
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did not provide a definition of the concepts of contractual and non-
contractual obligations in the Rome I and Rome II Regulation,
136
 and the 
ECJ has yet to define the type of obligations that are excluded from the 
scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  It is only in the realm of 
conflict of jurisdictions between the E.U. Member States that the ECJ has 
defined the concepts of contractual and non-contractual matters.  This is the 
case for claims arising out of precontractual liability, where the Tacconi 
judgment has, in the realm of conflict of jurisdictions, characterized two 
types of precontractual liability.  The first type of liability is a contractual 
type of liability that arises out of the breach of an obligation ―freely 
assumed by one party towards the other on the occasion of negotiations 
with a view to the formation of a contract.‖
137
  The second type of liability 
is a non-contractual type of liability that does not arise out of the breach of 
such a freely assumed obligation.
138
  While this distinction has been 
established in the realm of conflict of jurisdictions between the EU Member 
States, we will show that it can be extended to the realm of conflict of laws, 
and that it should be used to determine the type of precontractual liability 
that is excluded from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  In 
effect, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation does not cover liability that 
arises out of the breach of a freely assumed obligation by one party towards 
the other on the occasion of negotiations with a view to the formation of a 
contract (a).  Thus, liability that arises from the breach of a preliminary 
agreement or of an obligation arising out of a pollicitation is excluded from 
the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation (b). 
a.  The Definition of the Excluded Contractual Obligations 
The concept of a ―freely assumed obligation by one party towards 
another‖ is used by the ECJ in order to determine what matters are, 
according to Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation,
 
―related to a 
contract.‖
139 
 According to the ECJ, whenever the issue involves a freely 
assumed obligation by one party towards the other, it constitutes a 
contractual matter that triggers the application of Article 5(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation.
140
  Inversely, whenever the issue does not involve a 
 
136 DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 3.104. 
137 Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner 
Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, Judgment of the Court, 2002 E.C.R. I-07357, ¶ 27.  See supra 
Part I(A)(1). 
138 See supra Part I(A)(1). 
139 Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 84, art. 5(1). 
140 See Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des 
Surfaces SA , 1992 E.C.R. I-03967; see also H. Gaudement-Tallon, REV. CRIT. DIP 1989 
730; J.-M. Bischoff, obs., JDI 1993 469; J. Kullmann, obs., D. 1993. Somm. 214; P. 
Jourdain, obs., RTD Civ. 1993, 131; T. Azzi, Bruxelles I, Rome I, Rome II: regard sur la 
qualification en droit international privé communautaire, D. 2009, 1621. 
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freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other, it constitutes a 
non-contractual matter that triggers the application of Article 5(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation.
141
  It follows that the existence or the absence of a 
―freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other‖ determines 
whether the issue constitutes a contractual matter or a non-contractual 
matter for the purposes of applying the Brussels I Regulation. 
While the ECJ has defined the notions of contractual and non-
contractual matters in the Brussels I Regulation, it has yet to define the 
concepts of contractual obligations in the Rome I Regulation and of non-
contractual obligations in the Rome II Regulation.  This lack of definition 
has caused scholars to wonder whether the concepts of contractual 
obligations in the Rome I Regulation and of non-contractual obligations in 
the Rome II Regulation amount to the concepts of contractual and non-
contractual matters as defined by the ECJ case law on jurisdiction.
142
  The 
answer to this question has a direct impact on the applicable law to 
precontractual liability in EPIL.  Because Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation is only applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, we must determine whether 
such obligations amount to non-contractual matters as defined by the ECJ 
case law on jurisdiction or not.  Some scholars have argued that the 
―diverging ratio legis of these instruments constitutes a barrier to a common 
notion‖
143
 of the non-contractual area in the Brussels I Regulation, which 
determines the procedural rules in EPIL, and the Rome II Regulation, which 
determines the conflict-of-law rules in a non-contractual situation.
144
  
Others have argued that ―convergences are possible despite the different 
objectives and scheme of the [European] Regulations.‖
145
  Without 
venturing into detailed argumentation, we believe that the concept of non-
contractual obligations in the Rome II Regulation amounts to the concept of 
non-contractual matters in the Brussels I Regulation, and that Article 12 of 
the Rome II Regulation does not cover liability arising out of the breach of 
a freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other on the occasion 
of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract for the following 
 
141 Case 189/97, Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst & Co., 1988 
E.C.R. I-05565; B. Audit, obs., D. 1989. Somm. 254; H. Gaudemet-Tallon, note, REV.CRIT. 
DIP 1989 215; A. Huet, obs., JDI 1989 457; see also Azzi, supra note 140. 
142 See Marta Pertegas, The notion of contractual obligation in Brussels I and Rome I, in 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN BRUSSELS I AND ROME I 175 (J. Meeusen, et al., eds., 2004); Azzi, 
supra note 140; Scott, supra note 113, at 57; Valdhans, supra note 96, at  229–44. 
143 Pertegas, supra note 142, at 176. 
144 See M.-L. Niboyet & G. de Geouffre de La Pradelle, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ § 
252 (2007); B. Haftel, La notion de matière contractuelle en droit international privé ¶ 44 
(2008) (unpublished Phd. thesis, Université Panthéon-Assas,  Paris II) (on file with author). 
145 Pertegas, supra note 142, at 176; see also Azzi, supra note 140, at 1621–22; PLENDER 
& WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 738. 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:451 (2012) 
478 
reasons. 
First, Recital 7 of the Rome II Regulation clearly states that 
the substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should be 
consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (5) (Brussels I) and the 




It follows that the common concepts used by the instruments of 
European Private International Law must be construed consistently.  
Ensuring consistency between the European Regulations on Private 
International Law requires that all common concepts be given a common 
meaning.
147
  Thus, the concept of contractual obligations must amount to 
the concept of contractual matters as it is defined by the ECJ case law on 
jurisdiction.  The latter appears to be a wider concept that seems to include 
the former.
148
  In effect, a ―contractual obligation‖ is necessarily ―a matter 
relating to contract‖.  However, since the concept of ―matters relating to 
contract‖ is, according to the ECJ, ―not to be understood as covering a 
situation in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party 
towards the other,‖
149
 it follows that a ―contractual obligation‖ is 
necessarily a freely assumed obligation by one party towards another.  
Inversely, a ―non-contractual obligation‖ constitutes a ―non-contractual 
matter‖ and is not a freely assumed obligation by one party towards the 
other. 
Second, by characterizing culpa in contrahendo as non-contractual in 
the realm of conflict of laws, the European Legislature has chosen to be 
consistent with the characterization of precontractual liability in matters 
related to jurisdiction.
150
  The non-contractual characterization of culpa in 
contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation pleads in favor of a uniform 
characterization of all common concepts between the European Regulations 
on Private International Law.
151
  Such a uniform characterization is ―more 
natural, simpler and more coherent.‖
152
  It is also consistent with the 
Legislature‘s objective of providing uniform rules of private international 
law in the EU. 
Third, the uniform characterization of the contractual and non-
 
146 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37. 
147 Azzi, supra note 140, at 1622; Volders, supra note 49, at 464. 
148 Pertegas, supra note 142, at 181. 
149 Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Mécano-chimiques des 
Surfaces SA, 1992 E.C.R. I-03967. 
150 Azzi, supra note 140, at 1622. 
151 This view is expressed by Azzi.  See id. 
152 Id. 
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contractual areas in EPIL does not necessarily hinder the divergent 
objectives each Regulation aims to achieve.  The difference that separates 
the rules provided by each regulation does not stem from the 
characterization of the issue, but from the connecting factors that are 
designated by the Legislature.
153
  It can be argued that while the Brussels I 
Regulation aims to improve the proper administration of justice, the Rome I 
and Rome II Regulation aim to improve the predictability of the outcome of 
litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of 
judgments in the area of obligations.
154
  However, these objectives can be 
met through the choice of connecting factors and not necessarily through 
characterization.
155
  In effect, the state whose courts have jurisdiction by 
application of the Brussels I Regulation is not necessarily the state whose 
law governs the issue by application of the rules provided by the Rome I 
and Rome II Regulations.
156
 
Fourth, the exclusion of freely assumed obligations by one party 
towards the other from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation 
aims to protect the parties‘ expectations as to the applicable law.
157
  To hold 
otherwise, would subject the parties‘ existing contractual relationship to the 
law of their contemplated contractual relationship, by application of the lex 
contractus in negotio. The parties will be unfairly surprised by the 
application of the law governing another contract to their current 
contractual relationship.  Thus, obligations that arise out of a promise made 
by one of the parties to the other ought to be excluded from the scope of 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. 
Fifth, the exclusion of freely assumed obligations by one party towards 
the other from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation protects 
party autonomy by submitting obligations arising out of a promise made by 
one party towards the other to its own law.  In effect, a freely assumed 
obligation by one party towards another on the occasion of negotiations 
with a view to the formation of a contract is governed by its own law and 
 
153 Id. 
154 This objective is stated in Recital 6 of the Rome I and in Recital 6 of the Rome II 
Regulation.  According to both Recitals: 
The proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to improve 
the predictability of the outcome of litigation, certainty as to the law applicable and 
the free movement of judgments, for the conflict-of-law rules in the Member 
States to designate the same national law irrespective of the country of the court in 
which an action is brought. 
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, at para. 6; Council Regulation 864/2007, supra 
note 37, at para. 6. 
155 Azzi, supra note 140. 
156 Id. 
157 See infra Part II(A). 
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not by the law that governs the ultimate agreement it precedes. 
Finally, the concept of a ―freely assumed obligation‖ draws a clear line 
between contractual obligations and non-contractual obligations.  Such a 
clear-cut criterium is ―easily identifiable and reasonably foreseeable for the 
parties to the dispute.‖
158
  Moreover, it helps define the concept of 
―contractual obligations‖ narrowly which confers upon Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation a larger scope.  It is important that this article 
encompass the vast majority of precontractual liability cases in order to 
reach uniformity in the realm of conflict of laws between the Member 
States. 
It should be noted that the concept of a ―freely assumed obligation by 
one party towards another‖ has raised many objections from German 
scholars who have considered it too narrow for purposes of private 
international law.
159
  In their view, ―it is sufficient [in order to characterize 
the situation as contractual] for one of the parties to create the expectation 
of fulfillment of certain obligations and for the other party to rely on it, 
without necessarily freely assuming such obligations.‖
160
  Despite the 
German critique of the judgment, the narrow exception provided by the ECJ 
ought to be upheld.  We cannot allow ―the characterization of the ensuing 
precontractual liability to vary according to how the various national laws 
characterize the issue.‖
161
  The German view on the matter cannot be upheld 
only because it reflects the German position on characterization.  To hold 
otherwise would violate ―the principle that the key concepts of EPIL are 
given an autonomous meaning,‖
162
 and would introduce diversity where the 
Legislature has sought to achieve uniformity.  It follows that Article 12 of 
the Rome II Regulation does not cover liability arising out of the breach of 
a freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other on the occasion 
of negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract. 
b.  The List of Excluded Contractual Obligations 
There are two types of freely assumed obligations by one party 
towards the other on the occasion of negotiations with a view to the 
formation of a contract: obligations that arise from preliminary agreements, 
and obligations that arise from pollicitation. 
i.  Preliminary Agreements 
According to Professor Farnsworth, the term ―preliminary agreement‖ 
can refer to ―any agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, that is 
 
158 Pertegas, supra note 142, at 184. 
159 See Thoma, supra note 22, at 676; Lagarde, supra note 33, at 587. 
160 Thoma, supra note 22, at 676; see also Lagarde, supra note 33, at 587. 
161 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 731. 
162 Id. 
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made during negotiations in anticipation of some later agreement that will 
be the culmination of the negotiations.‖
163
  There are various types of 
preliminary agreements that are concluded on the occasion of 
negotiations.
164
 ―These agreements appear under a variety of names 
including ‗letters of intent,‘ ‗commitment letters,‘ ‗binders,‘ ‗agreements in 
principle,‘ ‗memoranda of understandings,‘ and ‗heads of agreement.‘‖
165
  
According to Professor J. Schmidt-Szalewski, preliminary agreements can 
be divided into two categories: preliminary agreements that affect the 




Professor J. Schmidt-Szalewski mentions two types of preliminary 
agreements that affect negotiations: preliminary agreements that organize 




Preliminary agreements that organize negotiations provide the rules 
that the parties must follow during the course of dealings prior to the 
conclusion of a contract.
168
  Such preliminary agreements only aim to 
organize the negotiation procedure and do not determine the outcome of 
negotiations.
169
  Parties can agree to organize their negotiations through 
specific bargaining rules that impose various obligations at the negotiation 
stage.  The parties can agree to be bound, for example, by the following 
precontractual obligations: an obligation of confidentiality, an obligation of 
disclosure, an obligation of exclusivity, an obligation to respect certain 
deadlines, and an obligation of loyalty.
170
 
Preliminary agreements that impose an obligation to negotiate can 
either impose an obligation to enter into negotiation or an obligation to 
continue negotiations.
171
  The first type of preliminary agreement 
encompasses agreements to start negotiations and ―preferential 
agreements.‖
172
  A ―preferential agreement‖ is an agreement whereby one 
party agrees to offer the conclusion of a contract exclusively to the other 
party in the event he decides to enter into negotiations.
173
 It differs from the 
agreement to start negotiations inasmuch as the first type of preliminary 
 
163 Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 249–50. 
164 Id. at 250. 
165 Id. 
166 Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, La force obligatoire à l’épreuve des avant-contrats, RTD 
Civ. 2000 25, 26, For a similar distinction, see Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163–64. 
167 Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 166, at 26; Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163–64. 
168 Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 166, at 26. 
169 Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163–64. 
170 For a list of such obligations, see Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 166, at 26. 
171 Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 166, at 28. 
172 Id. 
173 TERRÉ, supra note 4,at 195; Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 166, at 28. 
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agreement does not confer upon the party a preferential right to the 
conclusion of the contract. 
While preliminary agreements that impose an obligation to enter into 
negotiation signal the beginning of negotiations, preliminary agreements 
that impose an obligation to continue the negotiations mark a ―pause in the 
negotiations,‖
174
 and set out all the terms that have been agreed upon so far 
by the parties, who agree to continue the negotiations in order to reach the 
ultimate agreement.
175
  Two types of such agreements have been described 
by Professor Farnsworth: the ―agreement with open terms‖ and the 
―agreement to negotiate.‖
176
  The ―agreement with open terms‖ ―sets out 
most of the terms of the deal, and the parties agree to be bound by these 
terms.  But they undertake to continue negotiating on other matters to reach 
agreement on some terms that are left open but that will be contained in the 
ultimate agreement.‖
177
  This agreement has two legal effects on the parties.  
First, the parties have an obligation to negotiate in good faith and can incur 
liability if failure to reach agreement on those open terms results from a 
breach of that obligation.
178
  Second, if, ―despite continued negotiation by 
both parties, no agreement is reached on those open terms so that there is no 
ultimate agreement, the parties are bound by their original agreement, and 
the other matters are governed by whatever terms a court will supply.‖
179
  
The ―agreement to negotiate‖ is an agreement where the parties ―set out 
specific substantive terms of the deal but . . .  do not agree to be bound as to 
these terms.‖
180
  In contrast with the preliminary agreement with open 
terms, the parties are only bound by their obligation to negotiate in good 
faith.
181
  Therefore, ―if, despite negotiation by both parties, ultimate 
agreement is not reached, the parties are not bound by any agreement.‖
182
  
However, they might incur liability in the event of a breach of their 
obligation to negotiate in good faith.
183
 
Preliminary agreements that affect the conclusion of the ultimate 
agreement ―bring the parties closer to the ultimate agreement.‖
184
  These 
agreements affect the outcome of negotiations by ―securing consent to the 
ultimate agreement.‖
185
  According to Professor Schmidt-Szalewski, there 
 
174 TERRÉ, supra note 4, at 187. 
175 Bollée, supra note 67 at 2163–64; Schmidt- Szalewski, supra note 166, at 28. 
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are two types of preliminary agreements that affect the conclusion of the 
ultimate agreement.
186
  The first type of preliminary agreement is an 
―option contract‖ whereby one party has already given his consent to the 
ultimate agreement and agrees to hold the offer for a certain period of time 
while awaiting for the acceptance of the other party.
187
  This type of 
agreement differs from the ―preferential agreement‖ inasmuch as the party 
who is bound by the latter has only agreed to make an offer to the other 
party in the event he decides to enter into negotiations.188  The second type 
of preliminary agreement is an agreement whereby both parties agree to 
conclude the ultimate agreement but postpone the formation of the contract 
upon the completion of a particular formality.
189
 
The applicable law to liability arising out of the breach of a 
preliminary agreement has not been expressly determined by the Rome I 
and Rome II Regulations. The Legislature‘s silence has given rise to 
hesitation regarding the applicable law.  Four possible solutions have been 
advanced. 
According to the first theory, liability arising out of the breach of a 
preliminary agreement is excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation 
and falls within the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.  This 
interpretation cannot be upheld for two reasons. First, it contradicts the 
wording of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation which only applies to 
―non-contractual obligations.‖
190
 We have shown that freely assumed 
obligations by one party towards another on the occasion of negotiations 
with a view to the formation of a contract are excluded from the scope of 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.
191
 Second, this interpretation thwarts 
the parties‘ justified expectations by submitting the contractual relationship 
that they have established through the conclusion of a preliminary 
agreement, to the law that governs the contractual relationship that they 
were contemplating at the time the preliminary agreement was concluded. 
A second theory excludes liability arising out of the breach of a 
preliminary agreement from the scope of the Rome I Regulation and from 
the scope of the Rome II Regulation.  According to this theory, liability 
arising out of the breach of a preliminary agreement is not covered by either 
 
186 Id.; see also: TERRÉ, supra note 4, at 190. 
187 TERRÉ, supra note 4, at 191; Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 166, at 31. 
188 TERRÉ, supra note 4 at 195. 
189 Id.  See also Farnsworth supra note 1, at 251 where the author describes the 
―agreement to engage in a transaction‖ which ―involves a commitment by one or both parties 
to do something such as buy, sell, or lend in the future.‖  This agreement binds one of the 
parties to carry through the transaction, but ―postpones preparation and execution of the 
requisite documents and the attendant expense for such items as legal fees, indemnities, and 
taxes.‖ 
190 See supra Part I(B)(1)(a). 
191 See supra Part I(B)(1)(a). 
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one of the two European Regulations, but by the applicable law to 
contractual obligations in the relevant jurisdiction.  This law is determined 
according to the national conflict-of-law rules of the court where the claim 
has been brought.
192
  This interpretation cannot be upheld for two reasons.  
First, it reintroduces diversity where the European Legislature has sought to 
achieve uniformity.  Second, the Rome I Regulation did not exclude 
preliminary agreements from its scope.  Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation 
has excluded ―obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of 
a contract,‖
193
 only in so far as they fall within the material scope of Article 
12 of the Rome II Regulation.
194
  The Rome I Regulation has only excluded 
from its scope non-contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior to 
the conclusion of the contract. 
A third theory submits liability arising out of the breach of a 
preliminary agreement to the rules provided by the Rome I Regulation, but 
considers that every agreement that aims at the conclusion of another 
contract should not be viewed as an independent contract but as an 
―outgrowth of the contemplated contract‖
195 and should, therefore, be 
governed by the applicable law to the contract under negotiation.
196
  It is 
argued that this outcome reaches a coherent result whereby the issues of the 
existence of the ultimate agreement and of liability arising out of the breach 
of a preliminary agreement are governed by the same law, namely the law 
of the contract under negotiation.
197
 
According to Professor Bollée, incoherence might arise whenever the 
issues of the existence of the ultimate agreement and of the liability arising 
out of the breach of a preliminary agreement are governed by two different 
laws that treat both issues differently.
198
  This would be the case, for 
example, whenever the parties have concluded an option contract, whereby 
the promisor promises to hold the offer for a certain period of time.  The 
revocation by the promisor of the option contract before the time period 
elapses raises two issues.  First, it raises the issue of whether the acceptance 
that was issued by the other party after the revocation of the promise has 
given birth to the ultimate agreement.  Second, it raises the issue of the 
promisor‘s liability for unlawful revocation of the promise.  The application 
of the law that governs the ultimate agreement in the first instance, and the 
application of the law that governs the preliminary agreement in the second 
instance, will reach incoherent results whenever the two laws treat both 
issues differently.  This would be the case, for example, whenever the law 
 
192 Lagarde, supra note 33, at 584. 
193 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 1(i). 
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that governs the ultimate agreement states that the contract did not come 
into existence and that the defendant is precontractually liable for 
unlawfully revoking his promise, while the law that governs the preliminary 
agreement states that the ultimate agreement has been concluded, thereby 
exonerating the defendant from liability. In order to eliminate incoherence, 
authors have suggested submitting all issues to the law that governs the 
ultimate agreement.
199
  This law is applicable to the existence of the 
ultimate agreement by virtue of Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation,
200
 
and should, therefore, also govern liability arising out of the breach of a 
preliminary agreement. 
In spite of this last argument, this third theory cannot be upheld for 
three reasons.  First, this theory is without legal basis.  Nothing in the Rome 
I Regulation indicates that preliminary agreements are to be automatically 
governed by the applicable law to the ultimate agreement. The application 
of this law is only possible through a very loose interpretation of the rules 
provided by Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation.
201
 
Second, it thwarts the expectations of the parties who do not expect the 
law that governs their contemplated contractual relationship to govern their 
preliminary agreement. Indeed, parties who have concluded a preliminary 
agreement have shaped their behavior, at the precontractual stage, on the 
basis of their preliminary agreement and have taken into consideration the 
applicable law to such an agreement.  Unless the parties have specifically 
submitted their preliminary agreement to the law that governs their ultimate 
agreement, the former is governed by a law that is to be determined 
irrespective of the law of the contract under negotiation. 
Third, while it is true that, in some situations, the issues of the 
existence of the ultimate agreement and of liability arising out of the breach 
of a preliminary agreement are intertwined—especially when the parties 
have concluded a preliminary agreement that affects the conclusion of the 
ultimate agreement or a preferential agreement—it is wrong to assume that 
the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement to both issues 
reaches the more appropriate result.  On the contrary, it would seem that, in 
this particular situation, the application of the law that governs the 
preliminary agreement is the more appropriate law. 
First, the application of this law to the liability arising out of the 
breach of the preliminary agreement is the naturally applicable law to this 
type of liability.  Indeed, the parties who have organized their 
precontractual relationship through the conclusion of a preliminary 
agreement expect their behavior to be regulated by the law that governs it.  
They have relied on the provisions of this law in order to gauge the effects 
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of their actions. 
Second, the application of this law to the existence of the contract 
conforms to the will of the parties. By entering into a preliminary 
agreement that affects the conclusion of the ultimate agreement, the parties 
have organized the formation of the future contract. Their preliminary 
agreement has determined the conditions that are required for the 
conclusion of the contract.  In other words, they have laid down the rules 
that govern the formation of the ultimate agreement, in their preliminary 
agreement.  Therefore, it is only natural for the law that governs the 
preliminary agreement to govern the existence of the ultimate agreement.  
Parties that have entered into a preliminary agreement affecting the 
conclusion of the ultimate agreement have implicitly displaced the default 
rule provided by Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation.
202
  The conclusion 
of a preliminary agreement implies that the parties have chosen to submit 
the existence of the ultimate agreement to the law that governs the 
preliminary agreement itself.  In effect, the conclusion of a preliminary 
agreement that affects the conclusion of the ultimate agreement amounts to 
an implicit choice of law by the parties: by entering into such a preliminary 
agreement, the parties have implicitly chosen to displace the application of 
the law of the contract under negotiation, and have submitted the existence 
of the ultimate agreement to the law that governs their preliminary 
agreement.
203
  To hold otherwise would go against the principle of party 
autonomy which allows the parties to freely organize their precontractual 
relationship, and which, according to Recital 11 of the Rome I Regulation, 
constitutes ―one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-law rules in 
matters of contractual obligations.‖
204
  For the above-mentioned reasons, we 
cannot subscribe to the automatic application of the law of the contract 
under negotiation to the liability arising out of the breach of a preliminary 
agreement. 
A fourth possible theory would be to submit liability arising out of the 
breach of a preliminary agreement to the law that governs the preliminary 
agreement itself.  Despite the wording of Article 1 of the Rome I 
Regulation, this law is determined on the basis of the rules provided by the 
Rome I Regulation. 205  Indeed, Article 1 of the Rome I Regulation only 
 
202 According to this provision, ―the existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of 
a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the 
contract or term were valid.‖  Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 10(1). 
203 Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation states that the choice of law by the parties can 
either ―be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case.‖ Id. art. 3 (1).  It follows that whenever the parties have concluded 
a preliminary agreement, the circumstances of the case clearly demonstrate that they have 
chosen to submit the existence of the ultimate agreement to the law that governs their 
preliminary agreement. 
204 Id. at para. 11. 
205 See Thoma, supra note 22, at 678. 
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excludes from its scope precontractual liability as it is defined by Article 12 
of the Rome II Regulation, and did not exclude from its scope liability 
arising out of the breach of a preliminary agreement.  Therefore, the 
applicable law to liability arising out of the breach of a preliminary 
agreement is either chosen by the parties in the preliminary agreement 
itself, or determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation. 
Whenever the parties have inserted a choice of law clause in their 
preliminary agreement, the law that is chosen by the parties governs the 
liability arising out of the breach of the preliminary agreement.
206
 
Whenever the parties have not inserted a choice of law clause in their 
preliminary agreement, this law is determined on the basis of Article 4 of 
the Rome I Regulation.  This Article provides for the application of the law 
of the habitual residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance of 
the contract, unless it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the 
contract is manifestly more closely connected to the law of another country, 
or unless the debtor of the characteristic performance of the contract cannot 
be determined.
207
  In order to determine the law that governs liability arising 
out of the breach of a preliminary agreement, we must distinguish the 
situation where the debtor of the characteristic performance of the 
preliminary agreement cannot be determined from the situation where the 
debtor of the characteristic performance of the preliminary agreement can 
be determined. 
Whenever the debtor of the characteristic performance of the 
preliminary agreement cannot be determined, the applicable law is 
determined on the basis of the escape clause provided by Article 4(4) of the 
Rome I Regulation.  This would be the case, for example, whenever the 
parties have concluded a preliminary agreement that organizes 
negotiations.
208
  In this situation, both parties agree to be bound by the same 
types of obligations and it is not possible to determine the debtor of the 
characteristic performance of the contract.  According to Article 4(4) of the 
Rome I Regulation, ―the contract shall be governed by the law of the 
country with which it is most closely connected.‖
209
  It should be noted that 
the employment of this escape clause, in this situation, will most likely lead 
to the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement.  Recital 
21 of the Rome I Regulation states that 
[i]n the absence of choice, where the applicable law cannot be 
determined either on the basis of the fact that the contract can be 
categorized as one of the specified types or as being the law of the 
country of habitual residence of the party required to effect the 
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characteristic performance of the contract, the contract should be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected.  In order to determine that country, account should be 
taken, inter alia, of whether the contract in question has a very close 
relationship with another contract or contracts.‖
210
 
In effect, courts will most likely find that the preliminary agreement has a 
very close relationship to the ultimate agreement, leading, in most cases, to 
the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement. However, 
the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement is not 
automatic and depends on a factual analysis of the relevant contacts of the 
particular case.  Indeed, Recital 21 of the Rome I Regulation only provides 
guidelines that help courts determine the relevant contacts and does not 
impose the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement. 
Whenever the debtor of the characteristic performance of the 
preliminary agreement can be determined, the law that governs the 
preliminary agreement can either coincide with the law that governs the 
ultimate agreement or not.  The law that governs the preliminary agreement 
does not coincide with the law that governs the ultimate agreement 
whenever the debtor of the characteristic performance of the preliminary 
agreement is not the debtor of the characteristic performance of the ultimate 
agreement.
211
 This would be the case, for example, whenever the 
prospective buyer of goods has promised to hold his offer to buy the goods 
for a certain period of time in an option contract. In this situation, the debtor 
of the characteristic performance of the option contract is the prospective 
buyer, while the debtor of the characteristic performance of the ultimate 
sale agreement is the prospective seller. 
The law that governs the preliminary agreement coincides with the law 
that governs the ultimate agreement in two situations.  First, it coincides 
with the law of the ultimate agreement whenever the debtor of the 
characteristic performance of the preliminary agreement is the debtor of the 
characteristic performance of the ultimate agreement.  This would be the 
case, for example, whenever the parties have concluded an agreement with 
open terms, whereby the characteristic performance of this agreement 
coincides with the characteristic performance of the ultimate agreement.
212
  
Second, the law that governs the preliminary agreement coincides with the 
law of the ultimate agreement whenever the employment of the escape 
clause provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation leads to the 
application of the law of the ultimate agreement.  According to this 
provision, ―where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the 
contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that 
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indicated in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply‖.
213
  
It should be noted that the employment of the escape clause will, in most 
cases, lead to the application of the law that governs the ultimate agreement. 
According to Recital 20 of the Rome I Regulation, 
where the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a 
country other than that indicated in Article 4(1) or (2), an escape 
clause should provide that the law of that other country is to apply. 
In order to determine that country, account should be taken, inter 
alia, of whether the contract in question has a very close 
relationship with another contract or contracts.‖
214
 
However, the application of this law is not automatic. The employment of 
the escape clause is exceptional and can lead to the application of a 
different law whenever the factual situation is more closely connected to 
another law. Recital 20 of the Rome I Regulation only provides indications 
as to the relevant contacts that ought to be considered and does not impose 
the application of the law of the ultimate agreement. 
ii.  Pollicitation 
The wording of the Tacconi holding seems to suggest that ―whilst 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation requires an obligation freely 
assumed by one party towards the other, it does not require a contract to 
have been concluded.‖
215
  The concept of a freely assumed obligation by 
one party towards the other does not only encompass obligations that arise 
out of a concluded agreement between the parties, but seems to encompass 
obligations arising out of a unilateral act as well.  ―Unilateral acts may be 
generally defined as acts that are the manifestation of the will of one 
person.‖
216
  A unilateral act can be a source of obligations whenever one 
person has manifested his will to be bound by a promise that has not been 
accepted by the other.  It differs from a contract inasmuch as the latter 
requires a meeting of the minds, whereby one of the parties promises to do 
something to the other party who accepts the former‘s promise. 
A literal interpretation of the concept of a freely assumed obligation by 
one party towards the other would exclude liability that stems from the 
breach of an obligation arising out of a unilateral act from the scope of the 
Rome II Regulation.
217
  Moreover, it would seem that ―unilateral acts 
 
213 Article 4(3) of Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EU). 
214 Recital 20 of Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6 (EU).(emphasis 
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215 Scott, supra note 113, at 62. 
216 Monika Pauknerová, Law Applicable to Unilateral Juridical Acts and Uniform 
Conflict-of-law Rules, 6 J. of COMP. L. 125, 126 (2011). 
217 In support of this view, see Matthias Lehmann, Der Anwendungsbereich der Rom I—
Verordnung—Vertragsbegriff und vorvertragliche Rechtsverhältnisse, in EIN NEUES 
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intended to have legal effect relating to an existing or contemplated 
contract‖ fall within the scope of the Rome I Regulation.
218
  Indeed, Article 
11 of the Rome I Regulation expressly provides the applicable law to the 
formal validity of such acts.
219
  Thus, it appears that liability that stems 
from the breach of an obligation arising out of a unilateral act that is 
undertaken at the precontractual stage and that is intended to have a legal 
effect on the contemplated contract is excluded from the scope of Article 12 
of the Rome II Regulation.  This type of liability is governed by the rules 
provided by the Rome I Regulation.
220
 
At the negotiation stage, a unilateral act intended to have legal effect 
on the contemplated contract constitutes a ―pollicitation.‖  Pollicitation can 
be defined as a type of offer whereby the pollicitor promises to hold the 
offer for a certain period of time.  Pollicitation differs from a regular offer 
because it is characterized by the promise of the pollicitor to hold the offer 
for a certain period of time.  It also differs from an option contract because 
the pollicitor does not seek the offeree‘s consent as to the obligation to hold 
the offer.  It is a unilateral act that binds the pollicitor in the absence of an 
agreement between the two parties.
221
 
While the revocation of the offer falls within the scope of Article 12 of 
the Rome II Regulation,
222
 the revocation of a pollicitation is not covered by 
this provision.  The obligation arising out of a pollicitation cannot be 
characterized as non-contractual because it is freely assumed by one party 
towards the other.  Thus, liability arising out of the breach of such an 
obligation falls within the scope of the Rome I Regulation. 
The applicable law to liability arising out of the breach of a 
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pollicitation has not been expressly determined by the Rome I Regulation. 
We must determine this law through the application of the general rules 
provided by the Rome I Regulation.  However, this law cannot be chosen 
unilaterally by the pollicitor.  A choice of law clause is only valid when 
both parties have agreed on the applicable law. 
It follows that the applicable law to liability arising out of the breach 
of a pollicitation is determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I 
Regulation.  In principle, liability arising out of the breach of pollicitation is 
governed by the law of the habitual residence of the pollicitor, unless the 
application of this law is displaced in favor of the application of the law of 
the contract under negotiation. 
Liability arising out of the breach of a pollicitation is, in principle, 
determined on the basis of Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation.
223
  The 
implementation of this rule leads to the application of the law of the 
habitual residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance of the 
unilateral act. Because the promise to hold the offer is the characteristic 
performance of the pollicitation, liability arising out of the breach of a 
pollicitation would be governed by the law of the habitual residence of the 
pollicitor. It follows that liability arising out of the breach of the 
pollicitation is governed by the law that governs the pollicitation itself, 
irrespective of the law that governs the contemplated contract.  The absence 
of an agreement between parties does not preclude the application of the 
Rome I Regulation to the pollicitation. 
Technically, the rules provided by the Rome I Regulation are perfectly 
compatible with a freely assumed obligation by one party towards the other 
that does not arise out of an agreement between the two parties.
224
  
However, the application of the law that governs the pollicitation incurs two 
criticisms.  First, it might lead to incoherent results whenever the revocation 
of the pollicitation affects the existence of the contemplated contract and 
the defendant‘s precontractual liability.
225
  In this situation, the existence of 
the contract would be governed by the law of the contract under 
negotiation, while liability arising out of the breach of the pollicitation is 
governed by the law of the habitual residence of the pollicitor. Incoherence 
might arise whenever the two laws treat the issue of the existence of the 
contract differently.  Second, the application of the law of the pollicitation 
 
223 For the text of this provision, see infra note 264. 
224 See Lehman, supra note 217, at 132.  In support of the view that the rules provided by 
the Rome Convention on the applicable law to contractual obligations do not require the 
existence of an agreement, see Scott, supra note 113, at 66.  It should be noted, however, 
that the pollicitor cannot unilaterally submit the pollicitation to the law of his choice.  
According to Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation, ―[a] contract shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties.‖  Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 3(1).  Thus, the 
choice of law clause needs to be accepted by the other party. 
225 See infra Part II(A)(2)(a)(i). 
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might be unfair to the other party who did not foresee the application of the 
law of a unilateral act to which he did not consent. 
Whenever the application of the law of the habitual residence of the 
pollicitor leads to inappropriate results, it would be more appropriate to 
displace the application of the law of the habitual residence of the pollicitor 
through the use of the escape clause provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome I 
Regulation, and to submit liability arising out of the breach of the 
pollicitation to the law of the contemplated contract. While the escape 
clause provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation does not allow the 
automatic application of the law of the contemplated contract, this law 
ought to be designated for three reasons.  First, Article 11(3) of the Rome I 
Regulation designates the ―law which governs or would govern the contract 
in substance under this Regulation‖
226
 as one of the applicable laws to the 
formal validity of ―unilateral act intended to have legal effect relating to an 
existing or contemplated contract.‖
227
  Nothing precludes us from 
extending, through the use of the escape clause provided by Article 4(3) of 
the Rome I Regulation, the application of this law to the liability arising out 
of the breach of a pollicitation.
228
  In fact, it has been argued that ―unless 
otherwise provided in Rome I, the lex causae governs any issue in a 
contract, at least of private law character.‖
229
  Second, the application of this 
law helps eliminate incoherence by avoiding dépeçage.230  In effect, the 
issues of contract existence and of precontractual liability would be 
governed by the same law whenever the pollicitor has revoked his 
pollicitation.  Third, the application of the law of the contemplated contract 
would help submit all types of precontractual liability that do not arise out 
of the breach of a preliminary agreement to the same law.  In effect, liability 
arising out of the breach of a pollicitation and liability arising out of the 




226 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 11(3). 
227 Id.  See also infra note 254. 
228 See also Recital 20 of Council Regulation 593/2008, which states that 
where the contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than 
that indicated in Article 4(1) or (2), an escape clause should provide that the law of 
that other country is to apply.  In order to determine that country, account should 
be taken, inter alia, of whether the contract in question has a very close 
relationship with another contract or contracts.‖ 
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, para. 20 (emphasis added). 
229 Pauknerová, supra note 216, at 132. 
230 See infra Parts II(A)(2)(a)(i)–(ii). 
231 It should be noted, however, that although liability arising out of the revocation of an 
offer and liability arising out of the breach of a pollicitation are, in principle, governed by the 
same law, there are still notable differences between the two situations. Indeed, the 
applicable law that governs liability arising out of the revocation of the offer is determined 
on the basis of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation, while liability arising out of the breach 
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It follows that Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation does not cover 
freely assumed obligations by one party towards the other on the occasion 
of the negotiations.  However, that does not mean that Article 12 covers all 
types of non-contractual obligations that arise at the negotiation stage.  It 
only covers matters presenting a direct link with the dealings prior to the 
conclusion of a contract. 
2.  Culpa in Contrahendo Only Encompasses Non-Contractual Obligations 
Presenting a Direct Link with the Dealings Prior to the Conclusion of a 
Contract 
In order to determine the material scope of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation, we have to construe the wording of this provision in accordance 
with Recital 30 of the same Regulation.  According to Recital 30 of the 
Rome II Regulation, 
Culpa in contrahendo for the purposes of this Regulation is an 
autonomous concept and should not necessarily be interpreted within 
the meaning of national law.  It should include the violation of the 
duty of disclosure and the breakdown of contractual negotiations.  
Article 12 covers only non-contractual obligations presenting a direct 
link with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.  This 
means that if, while a contract is being negotiated, a person suffers 




In light of this Recital, we are able to determine which non-contractual 
obligations are excluded from the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation, and which non-contractual obligations fall within its scope. 
a.  The Excluded Non-Contractual Obligations 
Recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation expressly excludes from the 
scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation the situations where the 
negotiations only provide the contextual frame for the injury.
233
  According 
to this Recital, a physical injury that occurs at the negotiation stage is not 
directly linked with the dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.  In 
this situation, the defendant‘s liability cannot be characterized as 
precontractual, for the purposes of the Rome II Regulation, but falls within 
the scope of the general rule provided by Article 4 of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
 
of a pollicitation is determined on the basis of the Rome I Regulation, which means that the 
first law might be determined on the basis of Article 12 (2) whenever the lex contractus in 
negotio cannot be determined. 
232 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at para. 30. 
233 DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 526; Thoma, supra note 22, at 679; Volders First 
Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466. 
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By excluding this type of liability from the scope of Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation, the European Legislature, no doubt, had in mind the 
Bananenschale case of the German Supreme Court,234 in which the court 
held that a customer who had slipped on a banana skin in a department store 
is entitled to compensation under the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo.235 
b.  The Covered Non-Contractual Obligations 
The concept of a non-contractual obligation ―arising out of dealings 
prior to the conclusion of a contract‖ and presenting a direct link with such 
dealings has not been defined in EPIL.  Pending a definition of this concept, 
we believe that Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation covers two types of 
situations: (1) liability arising out of a conduct that affects the formation of 
the contract under negotiation; and (2) liability arising out of the breach of a 
non-contractual duty or obligation whose existence is due to the dealings 
prior to the conclusion of a contract. 
i.  Liability Arising Out of a Harmful Conduct That Affects the Formation of 
the Contract Under Negotiation 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation covers liability that arises out of 
a harmful conduct that affects the conclusion of the contract.  This conduct, 
which occurs prior to the conclusion of the contract, affects the formation of 
the contract in two ways.  It can either provoke the formation of the contract 
or prevent it from entering into existence.
236 
Culpa in contrahendo that provokes the formation of the contract 
encompasses two situations.  First, it encompasses the situation where culpa 
in contrahendo provokes the conclusion of an invalid contract.  This is the 
case, for example, whenever the contract has been formed through duress, 
misrepresentations or, because of the ―breach of a duty to disclose.‖
237
  In 
this situation, the contract would not have come into existence had the 
harmful conduct not occurred. 
Second, it encompasses the situation where the defendant‘s conduct 
has affected the substantial terms of the contract without necessarily leading 
to its invalidity.  In this situation, the contract would have still come into 
existence had the harmful conduct not occurred, albeit on different terms.  
 
234 See PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY: REPORTS TO THE XIIITH CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 
21. 
235 DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 527; Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466, 
note 30, Lagarde, supra note 33, at 591–92. 
236 For a similar distinction, see J. Schmidt, La sanction de la faute précontractuelle, 
RTD Civ. 1974 46; PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note  22, at 732.  See also DICKINSON, 
supra note 48, at 529, where the author distinguishes between ―situations in which a contract 
has actually been concluded‖ from situations where the ―claim is based on conduct of the 
defendant that has prevented a contract from being concluded.‖ 
237 DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 526. 
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The defendant‘s conduct has provoked the conclusion of a contract that is 
less favorable to the plaintiff.  This situation encompasses the violation of a 
duty to disclose whereby full disclosure would have lead to the conclusion 
of a different contract. It also encompasses the situation whereby 
misrepresentations or duress do not lead to the invalidity of the contract but 
to an alteration of its terms.
238
 
Culpa in contrahendo that prevents the formation of the contract 
includes situations whereby the contract did not come into existence 
because of the defendant‘s conduct.  This is the case whenever the 
defendant has unlawfully revoked his offer (Example 2 of the Introduction), 
or has broken off negotiations in bad faith (Examples 3 and 4 of the 
Introduction).  This last situation is provided by Recital 30 of the Rome II 
Regulation, which states that Article 12 of the same Regulation should 
include ―the breakdown of contractual negotiations.‖
239
 
ii.  Liability Arising Out of the Violation of Non-Contractual Duties and 
Obligations Whose Existence Is Due to the Dealings Prior to the 
Conclusion of a Contract 
In some instances, one of the laws in conflict will place non-
contractual duties and obligations upon the parties at the negotiation stage.  
This is the case, for example, whenever one of the laws in conflict places 
upon the parties a precontractual duty to disclose, a precontractual duty of 
confidentiality, or a precontractual duty of good faith.  Liability arising out 
of the breach of such duties and obligations is covered by Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation. 
These precontractual duties and obligations are characterized by two 
specific traits.  First, they are automatically placed upon parties who enter 
into negotiations.  Their existence is linked to that of dealings prior to the 
conclusion of the contract.  Such duties and obligations ought to be 
distinguished from obligations arising out of preliminary agreements.  
While an obligation that arises out of a preliminary agreement draws its 
existence from the preliminary agreement that binds the parties, an 
obligation arising from the mere fact that parties have entered into a 
negotiation only exists because the parties have established a precontractual 
relationship. 
Second, in some exceptional instances, the lifespan of some of those 
duties and obligations exceeds the timeframe of the negotiations.  In effect, 
some of these duties and obligations come into existence at the negotiation 
stage but continue to be placed on the negotiating parties even after the 
negotiations have ended.  This is the case, for example, whenever national 
 
238 See Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46. 
239 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, at para. 30. 
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laws place upon the parties a precontractual obligation of confidentiality.
240
  
While this obligation comes into existence at the negotiation stage, it 
continues to bind the parties after the negotiations have ended.  Thus, 
liability arising out of the breach of a precontractual obligation of 
confidentiality falls within the scope of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation, even though such a breach might have occurred after the 
negotiations have been broken off or after the contract under negotiation 
has been concluded. 
While this solution can seem a bit unorthodox, it ought to be upheld 
for two reasons.  First, it is in accordance with the wording of Article 12 of 
the Rome II Regulation.  Indeed, this provision covers ―non-contractual 
obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract.‖
241
  
The Legislature did not limit the material scope of this article to liability 
arising out of a harmful conduct that occurs prior to the conclusion of a 
contract.  The application of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation can be 
triggered by the breach of a non-contractual obligation that has come into 
existence during the parties‘ negotiations even though such an obligation 
has been breached at a later time.  Second, this solution helps achieve unity 
and predictability by submitting all aspects of culpa in contrahendo to the 
same law.  It should, however, be noted that this situation, is, to our 
knowledge, the only situation whereby the defendant‘s precontractual 
liability does not arise out of a conduct that occurs during the negotiations 
of a contract. 
In summary, there are two types of precontractual liability in EPIL: a 
contractual type of liability and a non-contractual type of precontractual 
liability.  Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only covers two types of 
non-contractual precontractual liability.  First, it covers liability arising out 
of a conduct that has either provoked or prevented the formation of the 
contract under negotiation.  Second, it covers, liability arising out of the 
breach of a non-contractual precontractual duty or obligation that has come 
into existence at the negotiation stage.  These two types of non-contractual 
liability are governed by a law that is determined on the basis of a 
contractual connecting factor. 
 
240 See, e.g., Wet betreffende de precontractuele informatie bij commerciële 
samenwerkingsovereenkomsten [Law on pre contractual information in commercial 
cooperation agreements], Dec. 19, 2005, Belgisch staatsblad [B.S.] [Official Gazette of 
Belgium], Jan. 18, 2006, available in English at http://www.eff-franchise.com/IMG/ 
pdf/Belgium_-_Franchise_Legislation_on_Precontractual_.pdf (providing, under Article 6, 
―the parties are held to the confidentiality of the information that they obtain in view of the 
conclusion of the agreement of commercial partnership, and may not use this information, 
directly or indirectly, outside of the agreement of commercial partnership to be concluded.‖). 
241 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art 12(1). 
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II.  THE CONTRACTUAL CONNECTING FACTOR OF CULPA IN 
CONTRAHENDO IN EPIL 
While the controversy caused by the non-contractual characterization 
of precontractual liability is lively,
242
 its scope is limited by the 
Legislature‘s choice of applicable law.
243
  Two sets of rules have been 
provided by the Legislature in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation: a 
general rule and a subsidiary set of connecting factors.
244
  These rules are 
not mandatory and can be displaced by the parties who are given the 
possibility to submit their precontractual liability to a law of their choice.
245
  
Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation allows the parties to submit non-
contractual obligations to the law of their choice ―by an agreement entered 
into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred‖ or ―where all the 
parties are pursuing a commercial activity; by an agreement freely 
negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred.‖
246
  Because 
culpa in contrahendo is a type of non-contractual liability that falls within 
the scope of the Rome II Regulation on the applicable law to non-
contractual obligations,
247
 the parties can, on the basis of Article 14 of the 
Rome II Regulation, decide to submit claims arising out of culpa in 
contrahendo to a law that they have chosen. 
This possibility is available to the parties whenever either one of the 
following two conditions is met.  First, the parties have the possibility to 
submit claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the law of their choice, 
after the harmful conduct giving rise to the damage has occurred.  In this 
situation, the parties will agree to submit their precontractual relationship to 
a retrospective law that will govern a situation that has occurred prior to the 
party‘s agreement on the choice of law.  Second, the parties can submit 
their precontractual relationship to the law of their choice at the beginning 
of their negotiations.  This possibility is only open to parties that are 
pursuing a commercial activity through their negotiations.  This second 
option is very convenient to sophisticated parties who are negotiating a 
complex business transaction over a long period of time.
248
 
In effect, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation provides the default 
 
242 This characterization has been severely criticized by German scholars.  Cf.  Thoma, 
supra note 22, at 676–78; Lagarde, supra note 33, at 587. 
243 Lagarde, supra note 33, at 591. 
244 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 466; PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra 
note 22, at 736; Lagarde, supra note 33, at 589–91; Thoma, supra note 22, at 681; Olivera 
Boskovic, Règlement Rome II (Obligations non contractuelles), RDI 2010, 95, at 95–97. 
245 See Pierre-Yves Gautier, Les aspects internationaux de la négociation, RTD Com. 
493 (1998); Olivera Boskovic, L’autonomie de la volonté dans le règlement Rome II, D. 
1639 (2009); Thoma, supra note 22, at 682. 
246 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 14. 
247 See supra Part I. 
248 See Gautier, supra note 245. 
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rules that apply to claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo whenever the 
parties did not choose to submit such claims to the law of their choice.  The 
first limb of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation provides the general rule 
applicable to claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo.  According to 
Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation 
the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract, regardless of whether 
the contract has been concluded or not, shall be the law that applies 




By inserting this provision, the European Legislature has chosen to 
submit claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in 
negotio, which is the law of the contract under negotiation, instead of the 




The second limb of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation provides an 
auxiliary rule, which determines subsidiary torts contacts that apply 
whenever the lex contractus in negotio cannot be determined. 
A.  The General Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio to Claims 
Arising out of Culpa in Contrahendo 
The first limb of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation submits claims 
arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in negotio, which 
is the law of the contract under negotiation.
251
  Because the lex contractus 
in negotio governs a non-contractual situation, it plays the role that is 
usually assigned to the lex delicti.  In effect, the European Legislature has 
borrowed the connecting factor of another EPIL category.  Through this 
course of action, the European Legislature was able to maintain the non-
contractual characterization of culpa in contrahendo while determining the 
applicable law on the basis of a contractual connecting factor. 
In order to evaluate the Legislature‘s choice to submit claims arising 
out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in negotio, we must, first, 
determine the applicable lex contractus in negotio. 
1.  The Determination of the Lex Contractus in Negotio 
Paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation states that: 
 
249 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37. 
250 The lex contractus in negotio is the law of the contract under negotiation. 
251 This idea was initially suggested in France by Pierre Bourel.  See PIERRE BOUREL, LES 
CONFLITS DE LOI EN MATIÈRE D‘OBLIGATIONS EXTRACONTRACTUELLES (1961).  It has also 
been suggested by the Max Planck Institute Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and 
Private International Law.  See MAX PLANCK INST., COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 96. 
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The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, regardless of whether 
the contract was actually concluded or not, shall be the law that 




Although Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation does not distinguish 
between the situation where the contract under negotiation was actually 
concluded and the situation where the contemplated contract was not 
entered into, the determination of the lex contractus in negotio is greatly 
affected by the outcome of the parties‘ negotiations.  Depending on whether 
the contract under negotiation was actually concluded or not, the lex 
contractus in negotio will be the law of the concluded contract—the lex 
contractus finalis—or the law of the putative contract—the lex contractus 
putativus. 
a.  The Lex Contractus in Negotio is the Lex Contractus Finalis 
Where culpa in contrahendo does not prevent the formation of the 
contract, the applicable law to the precontractual liability arising out of the 
defendant‘s conduct is the law that governs the concluded contract.  This is 
usually the case when the defendant‘s behavior has wrongfully provoked 
the formation of an invalid contract or has altered some of its terms (see 
Example 1 of the Introduction).  This is the case, for example, when the 
contract has been concluded through misrepresentations, breach of a duty to 
disclose certain material facts, intimidation or duress.
253
  Whenever this 
situation arises, the law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability 
is the law that governs the concluded contract or the lex contractus 
finalis.254 
The lex contractus finalis is determined by reference to the Rome I 
Regulation on the applicable law to contractual obligations.  Unless the 
concluded contract is a contract of carriage, a consumer contract, an 
insurance contract or an employment contract,
255
 the lex contractus finalis is 
 
252 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12(1). 
253 See DICKINSON, supra note 48 at 526; Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46. 
254 It should be noted that Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation submits the validity of 
the contract to the law which would govern it if the contract were valid.  According to 
Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation, ―[t]he existence and validity of a contract, or of any 
term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this 
Regulation if the contract or term were valid.‖  Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, 
art. 10(1). 
255 The law that governs these contracts is determined on the basis of special rules 
provided by Articles 5–8 of the Rome I Regulation.  According to Plender & Wilderspin, 
the rules applicable to the categories of contracts falling within the scope of those 
articles derogate both from art.3 of the Regulation, since they restrict party 
autonomy to some extent, and art.4, since each of them establishes a different 
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either directly chosen by the parties or determined by Article 4 of the Rome 
I Regulation in the absence of such a choice. 
i.  The Lex Contractus Finalis is Chosen by the Parties 
According to Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation, the lex contractus 
can be chosen by the parties.
256
  This situation ought to be distinguished 
from the one described by Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation, which 
authorizes the parties to submit the non-contractual obligation arising out of 
precontractual liability to the law of their choice.
257
  In the first situation, 
the parties have chosen to submit their contractual relationship to the law of 
their choice.  In the second situation, the parties have specifically submitted 
their precontractual relationship to the law of their choice.
258
  The 
distinction between the two afore-mentioned situations is fundamental.  
While Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation governs the parties‘ 
precontractual relationship in the first instance, its application is excluded in 
the second scenario.
  
It should be noted that the parties have the possibility 





method for selecting the applicable law in the absence of party choice. 
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77. 
256 Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation states that 
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.  The choice shall be 
made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the 
circumstances of the case.  By their choice the parties can select the law applicable 
to the whole or to part only of the contract. 
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 3.  On party autonomy in the Rome I 
Regulation, see PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77. 
257 According to Article 14(1) of the Rome II Regulation 
The parties may agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their 
choice: 
(a) by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred; 
or 
(b) where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity, also by an 
agreement freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage 
occurred. 
The choice shall be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the 
circumstances of the case and shall not prejudice the rights of third parties. 
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 14(1). 
258 See Gautier, supra note 245; Boskovic, supra note 245. 
259 See Bollée, supra note 67, at 2163. 
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The law that is chosen by the parties to govern their contractual 
relationship raises two issues whenever its application is extended to their 
precontractual relationship. 
First, the choice of law by the parties raises the issue of the validity of 
the choice of law clause.  Whenever culpa in contrahendo has provoked the 
conclusion of the contract through misrepresentation or duress, it is very 
likely that it has also provoked the conclusion of the choice of law clause.  
In such a case, the issue of the validity of the choice of law clause must be 
resolved prior to the determination of the applicable law to precontractual 
liability.  According to Article 3(5) of the Rome 1 Regulation, this issue is 
to be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10, 11, and 13 
of the same Regulation.
260
 
Second, an unresolved issue arises whenever the parties have chosen to 
submit different parts of the concluded contract to different laws.  Article 
3(1) of the Rome I Regulation
261
 allows voluntary dépeçage262 of the 
contract by the parties who can agree to submit only part of the contract to 
the law of their choice.  According to this provision, the parties can choose 
a law to govern one part of their contract while the other part will be 
governed by another law that is either chosen by them or left undetermined.  
Whenever the parties have resorted to the voluntary dépeçage of the 
contract, an issue arises as to the determination of the law that ought to 
govern their precontractual relationship. 
The Rome II Regulation does not provide the answer to this question.  
It would seem that this issue can be resolved in one of three ways.  The first 
solution would be to disregard the parties‘ choice of law whenever they 
submit their contract to different laws, and apply the rules provided by 
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, which determine the law that governs 
the concluded contract in the absence of a choice of law by the parties.  The 
second solution would be to submit precontractual liability to the law that 
governs the existence or the validity of the concluded contract because of 
the very close correlation between the contract‘s validity and the 
defendant‘s precontractual liability.
263
  The third possibility would be to 
consider that the lex contractus in negotio cannot be determined and to 
determine the applicable law to culpa in contrahendo on the basis of Article 
12(2) of the Rome II Regulation.  
 
260 ―The existence and validity of the consent of the parties as to the choice of the 
applicable law shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10, 11 and 
13.‖ Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 3(5). 
261 See DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 526; Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46. 
262 Dépeçage refers to the concept whereby different issues within a particular case may 
be governed by the laws of different states.  According to Black‘s Law Dictionary, dépecage 
designates ―a court‘s application of different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute; 
choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (2009). 
263 See infra Part II(A)(2)(a). 
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ii.  The Lex Contractus Finalis in the Absence of a Choice of Law by the 
Parties 
In the absence of a choice of law by the parties, Article 4 of the Rome 
I Regulation provides the applicable law.
264
  This provision establishes a 
―general regime for determining the applicable law in the absence of party 
 
264 Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation states that 
1.  To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in 
accordance with Article 3 and without prejudice to Articles 5 to 8, the law 
governing the contract shall be determined as follows: 
(a) a contract for the sale of goods shall be governed by the law of the country 
where the seller has his habitual residence; 
(b) a contract for the provision of services shall be governed by the law of the 
country where the service provider has his habitual residence; 
(c) a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or to a tenancy 
of immovable property shall be governed by the law of the country where the 
property is situated; 
(d) notwithstanding point (c), a tenancy of immovable property concluded for 
temporary private use for a period of no more than six consecutive months 
shall be governed by the law of the country where the landlord has his 
habitual residence, provided that the tenant is a natural person and has his 
habitual residence in the same country; 
(e) a franchise contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the 
franchisee has his habitual residence; 
(f) a distribution contract shall be governed by the law of the country where 
the distributor has his habitual residence; 
(g) a contract for the sale of goods by auction shall be governed by the law of 
the country where the auction takes place, if such a place can be determined; 
(h) a contract concluded within a multilateral system which brings together or 
facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling 
interests in financial instruments, as defined by Article 4(1), point (17) of 
Directive 2004/39/EC, in accordance with non-discretionary rules and 
governed by a single law, shall be governed by that law. 
2. Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the 
contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the 
contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to 
effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence. 
3. Where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is 
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in 
paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply. 
4. Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, 
the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most 
closely connected. 
Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4. 














 of the Rome I Regulation, ―which establish special rules for 
selecting the applicable law in the case of contracts of carriage, consumer 
contracts, insurance contracts and employment contracts.‖
270
 
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation establishes a system of jurisdiction-
selecting rules
271
 that can be displaced in favor of the law that has the 
closest connection to the contract. 
(1)  The Jurisdiction-Selecting Rules 
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation provides a general rule and 
―specific rules that determine the applicable law in eight types of 
contracts.‖
272
  The general rule is provided by paragraph 2 of Article 4 of 
the Rome I Regulation, and applies whenever the contract in question does 
not fall within the list of contracts enumerated by paragraph 1, or where the 
elements of the contract would be covered by more than one special rule 
provided for in paragraph 1.
273
  According to paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the 
Rome I Regulation, the contract is governed by the law of the ―country of 
the habitual residence of the party required to effect the characteristic 
performance of the contract.‖
274
  In other words, the contract is governed by 
the law of the habitual residence
275





265 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77. 
266 Article 5 of the Rome I Regulation provides the applicable law to contacts of carriage.  
Id. art. 5. 
267 Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation provides the applicable law to consumer contracts.  
Id. art. 6. 
268 Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation provides the applicable law to insurance contracts.  
Id. art. 7. 
269 Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation provides the applicable to individual employment 
contracts.  Id. art. 8. 
270 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77. 
271 A jurisdiction-selecting rule is a choice of law rule that designates the applicable law 
―on the basis of the physical contacts of the involved states (‗jurisdiction-selection‘), without 
regard to the content of their substantive laws.‖  Symeonides, supra note 42, at 181. It should 
not be confused with the choice of jurisdiction rule that determines the competence of the 
seized court in matters related to conflicts of jurisdictions. 
272 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 176–77. For the text of the provision, see 
supra note 264. 
273 See supra, note 264. 
274 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(2). 
275 Article 19 of the Rome I Regulation and Article 23 of the Rome II Regulation define 
the habitual residence of companies and other bodies, corporate or unincorporated, as the 
place of central administration and the habitual residence of a natural person acting in the 
course of his business activity as his principal place of business.  Council Regulation 
593/2008, supra note 38, art. 19; Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 23. 
276 The concept of characteristic performance is defined as being the performance for 
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The application of this general rule is set aside whenever the 
concluded contract falls within one of the categories enumerated by 
paragraph 1.  In this situation, the specific rules enumerated by this 
paragraph determine the applicable law.
277
 
(2)  The Law That Has the Closest Connection to the Contract 
Articles 4(3) and 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation provide a ―residual 
role for the connecting factor of the closest connection to the contract‖.
278
  
According to Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, the law that has the 
closest connection to the contract should apply in two situations. 
First, courts may determine the applicable law to the contract by 
searching for the closest connection whenever the lex contractus cannot be 
determined by virtue of Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation.  
Indeed, Article 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation states that ―[w]here the law 
applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the contract 




Second, Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation provides an escape 
clause that allows departure from the rules established in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation.  According to this provision, 
―[w]here it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is 
manifestly more closely connected with a country other than that indicated 
in paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.‖
280
  In effect, 
whenever it appears that the contract might be more closely connected to 
another country than to the country of the habitual residence of the debtor 
of the characteristic performance, the law of that country shall apply.  This 
mechanism is similar to the presumption method adopted by the Second 
Restatement.  However, the application of this escape clause should be used 
in certain cases and only where it is manifestly clear that the contract is 
 
which payment is due.  While such a criterion can help define most characteristic 
performances, it is insufficient for identifying the characteristic performance when no 
payment is due.  See Andrea Bonomi, The Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations—Some General Remarks, 10 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (2008); Pedro A. De Miguel Asensio, Applicable Law in the 
Absence of Choice to Contracts Relating to Intellectual or Industrial Property Rights, 10 
YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (2008); PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra 
note 22, at 188. 
277 It should be noted that, in most of the cases falling under paragraph 1 of Article 4 of 
the Rome I Regulation, the application of the special rule leads to the result that would have 
been reached by the application of the general rule contained in paragraph 2.  See PLENDER 
& WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 178. 
278 Id. at 194. 
279 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(4). 
280 Id. art. 4(3).  For the full text of this article, see supra note 60. 
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more closely connected to the law of another country.
281
 
In summary, whenever the contract has been concluded, the lex 
contractus in negotio might be one of five laws: (1) the law that is 
designated on the basis of Articles 5–8 of the Rome I Regulation whenever 
the concluded contract falls into one of the categories of contracts 
enumerated by these Articles; (2) the law chosen by the parties to govern 
the concluded contract; (3) the law provided by Article 4(1) of the Rome I 
regulation whenever the contract falls into one of the categories of contracts 
enumerated by this paragraph; (4) the law of the habitual residence of the 
debtor of the characteristic performance; or (5) the law that has the closest 
connection to the contract.  On the other hand, whenever the contract under 
negotiation did not come into existence, the lex contractus in negotio is the 
lex contractus putativus. 
b.  The Lex Contractus in Negotio is the Lex Contractus Putativus 
Where the contract under negotiation did not come into existence, the 
law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability is the law of the 
putative contract
282 or the lex contractus putativus.  This is usually the case 
when culpa in contrahendo has prevented the conclusion of the contract 
under negotiation.  In this situation, the defendant‘s behavior will have 
prevented the contract under negotiation from coming into existence.  This 
is the case, for example, when the defendant has broken off negotiations in 
bad faith (Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction), or when he has 
prematurely revoked his offer (Example 2 of the Introduction).
283
  
Whenever such situations arise, the law that governs the defendant‘s 
precontractual liability is the law of the contract under negotiation had it 
been entered into. 
The application of the law of the putative contract to the parties‘ 
precontractual relationship raises three issues.  First, this law can never 
result from the application of a choice of law clause that was contained in a 
draft contract which has been rejected.
284  
The absence of an agreement on 
the applicable law is evident in this situation and we cannot apply the law 
designated by a choice of law clause that was proposed by one party during 
negotiations and that has not been accepted by the other.  To hold 
otherwise, would unfairly surprise the party who did not agree to the choice 
of law clause proposed by the other.  The application of the choice of law 
clause is especially unfair whenever the disagreement over the choice of 
 
281 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 196. 
282 The term ―law of the putative contract‖ is used by several scholars.  See, e.g., H. Muir 
Watt, De la loi applicable à un contrat tacitement accepté, Rev. Crit. DIP 1995 300, 304–05 
(referring to ―la loi putative du contrat‖); Gautier, supra note 245 at 496; Volders, First 
Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467; Thoma, supra note 22, at 681. 
283 See DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 526; Schmidt, supra note 1, at 46. 
284 PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 736–37; Bollée, supra note 67, at 2165. 
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law clause has triggered the break off of negotiations.
285
  It follows that the 
applicable law to the putative contract should always be determined on the 
basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation.
286
 
Second, the lex contractus putativus raises the issue of the 
determination of the debtor of the characteristic performance of the 
contract.  While the determination of the debtor of the characteristic 
performance of the contract is relatively easy in cases where culpa in 
contrahendo does not prevent the conclusion of the negotiated contract, this 
determination, while still possible, can prove to be somewhat problematic 
whenever the negotiations are broken off at an early stage.
287
 
Third, the lex contractus putativus raises objections as to its legitimate 
application.  Indeed, the parties in an international negotiation did not agree 
to the contract and yet find their relationship governed by the law of a 
contract to which they did not adhere.  This is especially unfair to the 
defendant who has expressly rejected the contract under negotiation by 
breaking off negotiations (Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction) or by 
revoking the offer (Example 2 of the Introduction).  In such cases, the 
application of the lex contractus putativus appears to be purely fictitious 
and with no apparent legitimacy.
288
  On the other hand, it might also be 
argued that the plaintiff has reasonably relied on the conclusion of the 
contract and therefore has a legitimate right to the application of the law 
that would have governed the contract had it been entered into.
289
 
In summary, the lex contractus putativus is one of four laws: (1) the 
law provided by Articles 5, 6, 7, 8 of the Rome I Regulation whenever the 
contemplated contract falls into one of the categories of contracts that are 
designated by one of these Articles; (2) the law provided by Article 4(1) of 
the Rome I regulation whenever the contemplated contract falls into one of 
the categories of contracts enumerated by this paragraph; (3) the law of the 
 
285 PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 736–37. 
286 It should be noted, however, that some scholars have argued for the application, in 
this case, of the rules provided by Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation.  Such a solution 
seems to contradict the wording of the text, which subjects the application of these rules to 
situations where the lex contractus putativus cannot be determined.  This is clearly not the 
case whenever a draft contract contains a choice of law clause that has not been accepted by 
both parties.  In that case, the applicable law must be determined on the basis of Article 4 of 
the Rome I regulation.  This view is supported by Plender and Wilderspin who argue that 
―any choice of law clause proposed by one party but not accepted by the other is clearly 
irrelevant as a pointer to the applicable law [. . .] Thus, provided that it is possible to 
ascertain the law applicable to the putative contract by objective means, that law should be 
applicable to the question of precontractual liability.‖  PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 
22, at 737; see also, Bollée, supra note 67, at ¶ 8. 
287 See infra Part II(B)(2). 
288 Contra Légier, supra note 63 (determining that the application of the law of the 
contemplated contract to be in line with Articles 10 and 11 of the Rome II Regulation as well 
as with the national laws of some of the member states). 
289 See infra Part II(A)(2)(a). 
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habitual residence of the debtor of the contemplated characteristic 
performance; or (4) the law that would have had the closest connection to 
the contract had it been entered into. 
The lex contractus putativus ought to be distinguished from the lex 
contractus finalis for the following reasons. First, the lex contractus 
putativus applies whenever the contract under negotiation did not come into 
existence, while the lex contractus finalis applies whenever the contract 
under negotiation has been concluded.  Second, the lex contractus putativus 
can never result from the application of a choice of law clause that is 
contained in the draft contract which has been rejected, while the lex 
contractus finalis can be designated by the choice of law clause contained 
in the concluded contract.
290
  Third, the law of the place of residence of the 
debtor of the characteristic performance might prove to be harder to identify 
when it is the lex contractus putativus.291 
2.  The Appraisal of the Lex Contractus in Negotio 
By submitting claims arising out of precontractual liability to the lex 
contractus in negotio, the European Legislature has sought to unify and 
simplify the determination of the applicable law.  In order to offer an 
assessment of the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation, 
we must first analyze the results reached by its application. 
a.  The Analysis of the Results Reached by Application of the Lex 
Contractus in Negotio. 
Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation has chosen to submit claims 
arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex contractus in negotio.  The 
issue that we aim to discuss in this part of the essay is whether the rule 
provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation reaches favorable 
results every time a claim involving culpa in contrahendo is brought before 
a court of a member state.  Our aim is not to offer an appraisal of the 
application of the lex contractus in negotio in every possible scenario where 
the plaintiff seeks to establish the defendant‘s precontractual liability, but to 
determine whether the need to displace the lex contractus in negotio ever 
arises. 
A priori, it might be argued that it is completely inappropriate to 
determine the precontractual liability of the defendant by application of the 
law of the contract under negotiation for two reasons.  First, the application 
of the lex contractus finalis to the defendant‘s precontractual liability might 
upset the parties‘ expectations.  It might be argued that the parties could not 
have foreseen, at the time the contract was under negotiation, the 
application of the law governing their contractual relationship to their 
 
290 See supra Part II(A)(1)(a). 
291 See infra Part II(B)(2). 
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precontractual relationship.  In this situation, the lex contractus finalis 
operates retrospectively, as it applies to a situation that has, chronologically, 
preceded the existence of the contract. 
Second, the application of the lex contractus putativus to the 
defendant‘s precontractual liability whenever the contract under negotiation 
was not entered into might appear to be even more inappropriate.  In this 
situation the parties‘ precontractual relationship is governed by the 
applicable law to a fictitious contract.  The contract under negotiation did 
not come into existence and yet its law governs the defendant‘s 
precontractual liability.  This is especially unfair to the defendant who has 
expressly rejected the contract under negotiation by breaking off 
negotiations (Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction) or by revoking his offer 
(Example 2 of the Introduction).  In this case, the application of the lex 




Although these arguments might seem logical, their generalization 
ought to be avoided.  While it is true that in some situations the application 
of the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation might 
unfairly surprise the parties, we cannot assume that the application of the 
lex contractus in negotio reaches inappropriate results every time a court is 
faced with a claim arising out of precontractual liability.  In order to 
determine the efficiency of the rule we must, according to S. Symeonides, 
―examine the results the rule produces in several typical patterns formed by 
the aggregation or disbursement of the pertinent contacts . . . and the 
content of the laws of each contact state.‖
293
  Therefore, we will examine 
the results reached by the application of the lex contractus in negotio in two 
situations: the situation where the validity of the contract affects the 
defendant‘s precontractual liability and the situation where the two issues 
are not intertwined. 
i.  The Results Reached by the Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio 
Whenever the Existence or the Validity of the Contract Affects the 
Defendant’s Precontractual Liability 
Whenever the validity or the existence of the contract affects the 
defendant‘s precontractual liability, the two issues ought to be governed by 
the same law.  This situation arises whenever the laws in conflict take 
different positions as to the validity or the existence of the contract.  In this 
situation, displacing the lex contractus in negotio ought to be discouraged 
 
292 Contra Légier, supra note 63, at 155.  The author finds the application of the law of 
the contemplated contract to be in line with Articles 10 and 11 of the Rome II Regulation as 
well as with the national laws of some of the member states.  It can also be argued that, in 
this situation, the plaintiff has reasonably relied on the conclusion of the contract and, 
therefore, has a legitimate right to the application of its law. 
293 Symeonides, supra note 42, at188. 
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as it might lead to  incoherent and unfair results.  Two examples help 
illustrate this point: 
Example A: The first example is an example of culpa in contrahendo 
that has provoked the formation of the contract through misrepresentations 
(see Example 1 of the Introduction) or duress.  This is a case where the 
plaintiff seeks to void the contract and seeks damages for the defendant‘s 
wrongful behavior.  In this situation, the laws that are in conflict provide for 
different rules as to the validity of the contract and as to the defendant‘s 
precontractual liability.  According to the first law, the contract is invalid 
and the defendant is liable for harm caused by the conclusion of the invalid 
contract.  According to the second law, the contract is valid and the 
defendant is exonerated from any liability.  In this situation, each law has 
established a coherent system where the validity of the contract affects the 
defendant‘s liability.  Indeed, under the first law (law of state A), the 
invalidity of the contract is usually accompanied by the defendant‘s 
liability.  On the other hand, application of the second law (law of state B) 
will validate the contract, thus exonerating the defendant from liability.  
The use of dépeçage in this case will lead to one of two incoherent results 
that upset the carefully established balance of the provisions of the two laws 
in conflict. 
Under the first result, the contract is void by application of the first law 
(law of state A) to the issue of validity; but the defendant will escape 
liability by application of the second law (law of state B) to the issue of 
precontractual liability.  The simultaneous application of these two laws 
will establish an incoherent situation between the parties.  Under this result, 
the contract is void although the defendant‘s conduct that has provoked its 
conclusion is lawful.  Such a result ought to be avoided as it frustrates the 
interests of both states whose laws are in conflict as well as the parties‘ 
expectations. 
First, this result will frustrate the deterrence interests of state A.  This 
state has an interest in deterring unlawful conducts that provoke the 
formation of an invalid contract.  According to the law of state A, the 
invalidity of the contract does not suffice, by itself, to reach the desired 
level of deterrence, which is why the defendant is held precontractually 
liable for his conduct.  The application of state B‘s law will greatly hinder 
state A‘s deterrence interests by exonerating the defendant from 
precontractual liability.  Furthermore, state A‘s interest in compensating the 
plaintiff whose expectations have been thwarted by the defendant‘s 
conduct, will be severely impaired by the application of state B‘s law.  In 
effect, the plaintiff will be deprived of the benefits of the contract and of the 
benefits of liability. 
Second, state B‘s interest in validating the contract is severely 
impaired by the application of state A‘s law.  State B exonerates the 
defendant from precontractual liability and provides a conduct-liberating 
rule that salvages the contract.  It has provided a conduct-liberating rule at 
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the negotiation stage in order to encourage commercial transactions 
between the two parties.  The application of state A‘s law to the validity of 
the contract severely impairs, state B‘s interest in liberating the parties‘ 
conduct during negotiations. 
Third, this result is unfair to both parties.  While the plaintiff will be 
deprived of the benefits of the contract without reaping the benefits of 
liability, the defendant is deprived of the benefits of the contract for acting 
in conformity with the law that governs his precontractual liability.  In 
effect, the defendant will be deprived of the benefits of the contract for 
acting lawfully! 
Under the second result, the contract is deemed valid by application of 
the second law (law of state B) but the defendant will be held liable by 
application of the first law (law of state A).  The simultaneous application 
of these two laws will establish an incoherent situation between the parties.  
Under this result, the contract is valid although the defendant‘s conduct that 
has provoked its conclusion is unlawful.  Such a result ought to be avoided 
as it frustrates the interests of both states whose laws are in conflict as well 
as the parties‘ expectations. 
First, this result severely impairs state B‘s conduct-liberating interests 
at the negotiation stage.  State B wants to encourage commercial initiatives 
by giving the parties the freedom to negotiate without constraints.  
However, the application of State A‘s law to the defendant‘s precontractual 
liability goes against state B‘s conduct-liberating policies.  What is given by 
one hand is taken away by the other.  The application of state A‘s law to the 
defendant‘s precontractual liability will have the opposite effects.  Aware of 
his potential precontractual liability, the defendant will think twice before 
initiating negotiations, which will hinder state B‘s conduct-liberating 
policies. 
Second, this result will greatly hinder state A‘s interest in regulating 
contract formation.  This state has an interest in invalidating contracts that 
were wrongfully concluded.  The reason behind the defendant‘s 
precontractual liability is to deter the formation of wrongfully concluded 
contracts, in order  to protect the plaintiff from the effects of a contract that 
is deemed unfair.  The application of state B‘s law to the validity of the 
contract severely impairs the protection bestowed upon the plaintiff who is, 
according to state A, still bound by an unlawful contract. 
Third, this result is extremely unfair to the defendant who will be 
bound to a contract that was legally concluded, while being liable to the 
plaintiff for a conduct that has been deemed unlawful by the other law.  On 
the other hand, this result unfairly benefits the plaintiff who will retain the 
benefit of the contract in addition to the benefits of liability. 
Example B: The second example is an example of culpa in 
contrahendo that prevents the contract under negotiation from coming into 





  This is the case, for example, when the defendant revokes his 
offer and the plaintiff seeks to confirm the existence of the contract in spite 
of the defendant‘s revocation, while, subsidiarily, seeking damages from 
the defendant who has revoked his offer (Example 2 of the Introduction).  
In this situation, the laws that are in conflict provide for different rules as to 
the effects of the offer‘s revocation and as to the defendant‘s precontractual 
liability.  According to the first law (law of state C), the revocation of the 
offer does not prevent the contract from coming into existence, while 
according to the second law (law of state D), the revocation of the offer 
prevents the formation of the contract but renders the defendant liable.  In 
this situation, each law has established a coherent system whereby the 
formation of the contract affects the defendant‘s liability.  Under the law of 
state C, the formation of the contract exonerates the defendant from 
precontractual liability.  On the other hand, application of the law of state D 
precludes the formation of the contract while rendering the defendant liable.  
The use of dépeçage in this case will lead to one of two incoherent results 
that upset the carefully established balance of the provisions of each law. 
Under the first result, the contract is valid by application of the law of 
state C, while the defendant will be held liable by application of the law of 
state D.  In this situation, the use of dépeçage, renders the defendant liable 
for preventing the conclusion of a contract that has been deemed concluded 
by the same court.  This absurd result alone ought to discourage the use of 
dépeçage in this case.  It should be noted that this result is purely theoretical 
and can never be reached in practice.
295
 
Under the second result, the revocation of the offer prevents the 
conclusion of the contract by application of the law of state D, whilst the 
defendant is exonerated from liability by application of the law of state C.  
This result ought to be rejected for the following reasons. 
First, this result frustrates the interests of both states whose laws are in 
conflict.  State D has an interest in protecting the plaintiff by deterring the 
unlawful revocation of the offer.  While this state does not want to ensure 
the formation of the contract, it seeks to enforce its conduct-regulating 
policies at the negotiation stage by holding the defendant liable for 
unlawfully revoking his offer.  The application of the law of state C to the 
defendant‘s precontractual liability severely impairs these interests.  
Moreover, the application of the law of state C to the defendant‘s 
precontractual liability goes against state C‘s own interests.  Indeed, this 
state seeks to protect the plaintiff by binding the offeror to the contract he 
has offered to conclude.  The law of state C only excludes the defendant‘s 
precontractual liability because it deems he is contractually liable towards 
 
294 Although technically in this case culpa in contrahendo has not prevented the contract 
from coming into existence under one of the laws in conflict. 
295 Usually, the seized court will not examine the plaintiff‘s subsidiary claim whenever it 
has ruled in his favor on the first claim. 
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the plaintiff.  In effect, the interests of this state will be better served by the 
application of the law of state D to the defendant‘s precontractual liability. 
Second, this result is completely unfair to the plaintiff, who is deprived 
of the benefits of the contract and of compensation, even though he is the 
party whose protection is sought by the two laws.  On the other hand, the 
defendant is unrightfully exonerated of liability.  Although his conduct is 
considered to be unlawful by the two laws that are in conflict, it is validated 
by the untimely use of dépeçage. 
In summary, the use of dépeçage will benefit the wrongdoer, to the 
detriment of the interests of the states whose laws are in conflict, and to the 
detriment of the plaintiff who has a legitimate right to benefit from the 
protection that is bestowed upon him by these laws.  Thus, it would be 
inappropriate to displace the application of the lex contractus in negotio 
whenever the defendant‘s precontractual liability is affected by the issue of 
contract validity. 
ii.  The Results Reached by the Application of the Lex Contractus in 
Negotio Whenever the Existence or the Validity of the Contract Does Not 
Affect the Defendant’s Precontractual Liability 
The existence or validity of the contract is not at issue whenever the 
laws in conflict provide the same answer to the question of the contract‘s 
existence or validity.  Two examples help illustrate this scenario. 
The first example is an example of culpa in contrahendo that has 
altered the terms of the concluded contract without affecting its validity 
(Example 1of the Introduction).  In this case, the contract is deemed valid 
by the laws of the two countries closely connected to the issue, but only one 
of the laws in conflict awards damages to the plaintiff.
296
 
The second example is an example of culpa in contrahendo that has 
prevented the formation of the contract by the breaking off of negotiations 
(Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction).  In this case, both laws in conflict 
consider the contract to be non-existent, but only one of the laws in conflict 
awards damages to the plaintiff for the breach of the precontractual duty of 
good faith. 
In order to determine whether the application of the lex contractus in 
negotio reaches favorable results in the above-mentioned scenarios, we 
must evaluate its application in three cases: the case where the lex 
contractus in negotio is chosen by the parties, the case where the lex 
contractus in negotio is determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I 
Regulation,
297
 and the case where it is determined by employment of the 
 
296 This would be the case in France where the defendant can be held liable for 
misrepresentations that alter the terms of the contract without voiding it.  TERRÉ, supra note 
4, at 238. 
297 See supra Part II(A)(1). 




(1) The Results Reached by Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio 
That Is Chosen by the Parties 
Whenever the lex contractus in negotio is the law chosen by the parties 
to govern their contractual relationship, the issue is whether such a law is 
equally appropriate to govern their precontractual relationship.  This 
situation only arises whenever the contract under negotiation has already 
been entered into and the parties have chosen to submit their contract to a 
law of their choice.
298  Because of the freedom given to the parties in the 
choice of the law that governs the concluded contract, the results reached by 
application of this law to precontractual liability can vary greatly.  While 
the application of the choice of law clause to precontractual liability can 
produce favorable results, it can also result in an inappropriate outcome.  
The main argument against the application of the choice of law clause 
provided in the contract is that the parties did not intend to submit their 
precontractual relationship to such a law, but have only chosen this law to 
govern their contractual relationship.  This situation is not to be confused 
with the one described in Article 14 of the Rome II Regulation.  According 
to this article, the parties have the possibility to submit their precontractual 
relationship to the law of their choice either before or after the event giving 
rise to the damage occurs.
299
  Whenever the parties have not expressly 
chosen to submit their precontractual liability to the law of their choice, we 
cannot assume that they have intended to submit their precontractual 
relationship to the law that governs their contractual relationship.  This is 
especially true whenever the parties did not even consider the issue of 
precontractual liability.
300
  Furthermore, the choice of law clause contained 
in the contract might lead to the application of the law of a state that is very 
loosely connected to the parties‘ precontractual relationship.  This is the 
 
298 See supra Part II(A)(1). 
299 According to Article 14(1) of the Rome II Regulation: 
The parties may agree to submit non-contractual obligations to the law of their 
choice: 
(a) by an agreement entered into after the event giving rise to the damage occurred; 
or 
(b) where all the parties are pursuing a commercial activity, also by an agreement 
freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage occurred.‖ 
Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 14(1). 
300 It should be noted that, whenever the validity of the contract and the precontractual 
liability of the defendant are intertwined, the application of the choice of law clause will not 
unfairly surprise the parties who have agreed to submit the validity of the contract to this 
law. 
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case, for example, whenever the parties choose to submit their contract to 
the law of the place of performance, which does not coincide with either 
party‘s place of residence, the place of harm, the place of the conduct or the 
place where the parties‘ precontractual relationship is centered.  In this 
situation, all the relevant contacts
301
 are not located in the country of 
performance of the contract, which is, arguably, less interested in regulating 
the parties‘ precontractual liability than the law of the state of the habitual 
residence of one of the parties.
302 
(2)  The Results Reached by Application of Lex Contractus in Negotio That 
Is Not Chosen by the Parties 
When the parties did not,
303
 or could not,
304
 choose to submit the 
contract under negotiation to a particular law, the lex contractus in negotio 
is to be determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation.  This 
law can be determined either on the basis of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 of 
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation.
305
  Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation 
determines the applicable law whether the contract under negotiation has 
been concluded or not.  However, assessing the results of the application of 
the lex contractus in negotio in all these situations would prove too long a 
task for the purposes of this essay.  Therefore, we have decided to evaluate 
the need to displace the application of the lex contractus in negotio only in 
the situation where the defendant has broken off negotiations, thus 
preventing the parties‘ contemplated contract from coming into existence.  
In this situation, the lex contractus in negotio is the lex contractus 
putativus, or the law of the putative contract. 
We will assess the results of the application of the lex contractus 
putativus in two situations.  The first situation is the one where the 
contemplated contract is governed by the rule provided by Article 4(2) of 
the Rome I Regulation.  The second situation is the one described by 
Example 4 of the Introduction,
306
 and where the contemplated contract is a 
contract for the sale of land. 
(a)  The Results Reached by Application of the Lex Contractus In Negotio 
That Is Determined on the Basis of Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation 
When the contemplated contract is governed by the rule provided by 
 
301 The place of the conduct, the place of injury, the place of negotiation, and the place of 
the respective residences of the parties.  See supra Part II(A)(1). 
302 Unless it is argued that, since the defendant‘s conduct has altered the conditions of 
performance of the contract, the place of performance has a conduct-regulating interest. 
303 When the contract under negotiation has been concluded. 
304 When the contract under negotiation has not been concluded. 
305 See supra Part II(A)(1). 
306 See supra Introduction. 
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Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation, the law that governs the parties‘ 
precontractual liability is the law of the habitual residence of the debtor of 
the characteristic performance of the contemplated contract.
307 
The application of the rule provided by Article 4(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation reaches favorable results in the following cases.  (1) The case 
where both parties are residents of the same country.  This situation is often 
characterized as a false conflict usually governed by the law of the common 
residence of the parties.
308
  (2) The case where the defendant is residing in a 
country that holds him liable for precontractual liability, whereas the 
plaintiff is residing in a country that exonerates the defendant.  This case is 
usually characterized as an unprovided-for case, to which the law of the 
residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance might be well 
suited.  Indeed, the application of this law is fair to both parties who should 
have relied on its application whenever they are conducting business.  (3) It 
might also be argued that the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II 
Regulation is equally suitable in true conflicts situations where all the 
conflicting laws have an interest in the application of their respective 
laws.
309
  It might be argued that the law of the place of residence of the 
debtor of the characteristic performance of the contract coincides with the 
parties‘ expectations.  On one hand, the debtor has, most likely, relied on 
the law of his habitual residence in order to conduct his business, while, on 
the other hand, the creditor, who is likely seeking the services of the debtor, 
should be aware of the potential application of the law of the debtor‘s 
habitual residence.
310
  While this argument can be made in most cases 
involving a true conflict situation, it has been argued that the application of 
the lex contractus in negotio 
could impose on one of the contracting parties the stricter 
requirements of the law of the place of habitual residence of the 
other contracting party in the precontractual stage despite the fact 
that the contract may not be eventually concluded or has not been 
concluded.  Such outcome is neither fair nor efficient as it creates 




This might be the case in the scenario described by Example 3 of the 
Introduction.  In this example, a U.K. resident has broken off negotiations 
with a French resident who is the debtor of the characteristic performance 
 
307 See supra Part II(A)(1). 
308 See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). 
309 The distinction between, false conflicts, true conflicts, and unprovided-for cases was 
first suggested by Brainerd Currie. For a summary of Currie‘s theories, see WILLIAM M.  
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 78 (2002). 
310 See Moura Vicente, supra note 22, at 713. 
311 Thoma, supra note 22, at 682. 
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of the contract.  This is a true conflict situation whereby each law in conflict 
can claim jurisdiction.  According to U.K. law, which does not impose a 
precontractual duty of good faith,
312
 the defendant is not liable, while under 
French law the defendant is liable for the violation of the precontractual 
duty of good faith.
313
  According to article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation, 
this issue is governed by French law, which is the law of the habitual 
residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance of the contract.  
While this law has an interest in regulating the parties‘ conduct during the 
negotiations of a contract and in protecting its residents from an abrupt 
break off of negotiations, the application of French law is objectionable for 
the following reasons.  
First, the U.K. has an ―aleatory view‖ of negotiations: ―a party that 
enters negotiations in the hope of the gain that will result from the final 
agreement bears the risk of whatever loss results if the other party breaks 
off the negotiations‖.
314
 According to Professor Farnsworth, ―this aleatory 
view of negotiations rests on a concern that limiting the freedom of 
negotiation might discourage parties from entering negotiations.‖
315
  In this 
instance, the defendant has probably broken off negotiations because he has 
received a better offer from another seller.  To hold him liable for seeking 
to optimize his profits would severely impair the U.K.‘s conduct-liberating 
interests.  Indeed, the U.K.‘s policy of optimizing the distribution of riches 
will be greatly hindered by the application of French law. 
Second, while France may have an interest in deterring the break off of 
negotiations in bad faith and in protecting its residents from economic loss, 
we cannot impose on one contracting party the stricter requirements of the 
law of the place of residency of the other party, when the contract under 
negotiation has not been concluded.  To hold otherwise would violate the 
rules of comity and allow one country to extend its imperialistic views to 
non-residents. 
Third, the application of the lex contractus in negotio is unfair to the 
defendant who has relied in good faith on the law of his residence in order 
to break off negotiations.  While it might be argued that he should have 
foreseen the application of the law of the habitual residence of the debtor of 
the characteristic performance of the contemplated contract, it would be 
unfair to subject him to the law of a contract that he has expressly rejected. 
Fourth, the plaintiff‘s expectations are not completely thwarted by the 
displacement of the law of the contract under negotiation.  As a business 
man, he has to bear the risks of his endeavors.  While he may have a right to 
rely on the law of his habitual residence, he cannot be unfairly surprised by 
 
312 Cf.  Banakas, supra note 16; Musy, supra note 16; Powell, supra note 21, at 38. 
313 Chambre commerciale et financière [Cass. Com.] [Commercial and financial court], 
22 avril 1997, D. 1998, 45, note Patrick Chauvel (Fr.); Schmidt supra note 1, at 46. 
314 Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 221. 
315 Id. 
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the application of the law of the habitual residence of the person he is 
conducting business with and coincidentally, the law of the place of 
performance of the contemplated contract. 
While the above-mentioned example illustrates some of the unfair 
results to which the application of the rule provided by Article 12(1) might 
lead, it does not provide conclusive evidence in favor of displacing the lex 
contractus in negotio.  In fact, an argument can always be made in favor of 
the application of the lex contractus in negotio whenever it is the law of the 
habitual residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance.  This 
hesitation stems from the choice of contact that is used to determine the 
applicable law whenever the lex contractus in negotio is determined on the 
basis of Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation.  Whatever view is taken as 
to the appropriateness of the lex contractus in negotio when it is determined 
on the basis of Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation, this next situation 
will provide conclusive evidence in favor of the need to provide escape 
devices that allow the displacement of the lex contractus in negotio. 
(b)  The Results Reached by the Application of the Lex Contractus in 
Negotio That Is Determined on the Basis of Article 4(1)(c) of the Rome I 
Regulation 
Example 4 of the introduction gives a clear illustration of the 
deficiencies of the lex contractus in negotio.  In this situation, the American 
defendant has broken off negotiations with a U.K. plaintiff for the sale of 
land located in Germany.  Because the parties‘ contemplated contract is a 
contract for the sale of land, it falls within one of the categories of contracts 
enumerated by paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation and is 
governed by German law which is the ―law of the country where the 
property is situated.‖
316
  Thus, according to German law, the defendant is 
liable for breaking off the negotiations in bad faith.
317
 
The application of German law in this case is completely inappropriate 
and should be displaced for the following reasons. 
First, Germany has arguably no interest in regulating a case of 
precontractual liability which does not involve any of its residents and 
which has occurred entirely outside of its borders.  While Germany might 
have an interest in deterring a conduct that occurs within its borders or in 
compensating a German victim that suffers an injury from the break off of 
negotiations, it has no interest in applying its law when all the negotiating 
parties are not residents of Germany and when the negotiations are held 
entirely outside of Germany.  Moreover, Germany has no immediate reason 
to deter a conduct that has occurred outside its borders and that has caused 
 
316 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(1). 
317 Cf. Banakas, supra note 16; Musy, supra note 16. 
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an injury to a non-resident of Germany.
318
  In this case, the application of 
German law is triggered by a completely fictitious contact that bares no 
relationship to the issue at hand.  Indeed, the application of German law is 
triggered by the situs of a property that was to be the subject matter of a 
contemplated contract that never came into existence.   
Second, while it might be argued that, by imposing a precontractual 
duty of good faith on the parties, Germany has an interest in protecting the 
owners of German property during the negotiations of a contract for the sale 
of land located in Germany, the application of German law in this particular 
situation harms the defendant who owns the land.  In this particular case, 
the party that broke off the negotiations is the owner of the property, whose 
protection is sought by German Legislature.  In effect, the application of 
German law goes against its protective policies, by rendering liable the very 
person it has sought to protect.  The present case ought to be distinguished 
from the situation where the potential buyer of land breaks off negotiations 
with the owner.  In this latter situation, the application of German law 
renders the potential buyer of land liable towards the owner, thus protecting 
the owner of land in Germany from injury arising out of the breach of the 
precontractual duty of good faith. 
Third, whatever view is taken as to the existence of German interests 
in this case, it cannot be argued that Germany‘s interests outweigh the 
interests of the United Kingdom or the United States.  On the contrary, the 
application of German law severely impairs the interests of the countries of 
residence of both parties.  Indeed, both, the United Kingdom and the United 
States do not impose a precontractual duty of good faith during the 
negotiations of a contract.
319
  Both countries have an interest in liberating 
conduct during negotiations and in encouraging commercial initiatives.  It 
would be unwise to allow Germany to impose its policies on other states 
when the situation is so loosely connected to Germany. 
Fourth, the application of German law frustrates the parties‘ justified 
expectations.  The defendant is unfairly surprised by the application of 
German law in this situation.  He has relied on the law of the place of his 
habitual residence in order to break off negotiations.  While he may have 
foreseen the applicability of the law of the habitual residence of the 
potential buyer of land, he did not account for the application of the law of 
the situs of a property whose ownership is not an issue in this case.  We 
cannot expect the defendant‘s precontractual liability to be governed by the 
law of the place where he owns property when the ownership of this 
 
318 And who is not of German nationality. 
319 For U.S. Law, see Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 427 Mass 
509, 517 (1998); see also, F.D.I.C. v. LeBlanc, 85 F.3d 815 (1st Cir. 1996); BURTON & 
ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 330 (stating that ―American law imposes no general duty to 
negotiate a contract in good faith‖).  For U.K. law, see Banakas, supra note 16; see also, 
Musy, supra note 16; Powell, supra note 21. 
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property is not the subject matter of the plaintiff‘s claim.
320
  In this 
particular situation, both parties agree that the ownership of land did not 
switch hands.  The issue relates to the legality of the defendant‘s behavior 
during the negotiations of a contract.  There is no reason to link this issue to 
the subject matter of a contract that never came into existence.  To hold 
otherwise would require the seller of land to inquire about the law of every 
state where he owns land for sale.  While it might not seem like a heavy 
burden whenever the sale of land constitutes a one-time occurrence, it might 
seriously inconvenience realty companies that are based in one country but 
own land in several others.  It might also cause an inconvenience to the 
defendant that specializes in multiple activities.  For instance, a defendant 
that sells land and offers construction services will have to behave 
differently depending on the subject matter of the contract under 
negotiation.  Indeed, the applicable law to the defendant‘s precontractual 
liability whenever the subject matter of the contract is the sale of land is the 
law of the situs of the property, while the applicable law to precontractual 
liability arising out of the negotiations of a construction contract is the law 
of the habitual residence of the defendant.
321
  Thus, the same potential 
debtor might have to behave differently based on the subject matter of the 
contract under negotiation.  To put the burden of inquiring about the 
contents of so many laws on the same defendant can prove to be excessive. 
Fifth, the plaintiff has no right to rely on German law in order to get 
compensation.  According to U.K. law, which is the law of the plaintiff‘s 
habitual residence and, arguably, the law where the injury has manifested 
itself, he has no right to compensation.  The plaintiff has no right to the 
application of the law of a place where he does not own property and where 
he does virtually no business.  Thus, the application of the lex contractus in 
negotio is completely inappropriate in this situation and should be 
displaced.  This last scenario presents a compelling argument in favor of the 
displacement of the lex contractus in negotio. 
(c)  The Results Reached by Application of the Lex Contractus In Negotio 
That Is Determined on the Basis of the Escape Clause 
Whenever the lex contractus in negotio is determined on the basis of 
the escape clause provided by Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, it is the 
law of the country that has the closest connection to the contract.
322
  The 
employment of the escape clause provided by Article 4 of the Rome I 
Regulation has two major flaws. 
 
320 In this situation, the issue is the defendant‘s precontractual liability.  Both parties have 
agreed that the contract has not been concluded. 
321 Article 4(1) b of the Rome I Regulation states that: ―a contract for the provision of 
services shall be governed by the law of the country where the service provider has his 
habitual residence.‖  Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(1). 
322 See supra Part II(A)(1). 
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First, the employment of the escape clause requires the seised court to 
search for the law of the country that has the closest connection to the 
contract under negotiation, which does not necessarily coincide with the 
country that has the closest connection to the non-contractual obligation 
arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract.  Instead of 
searching for the law of the country that has the closest connection to the 
parties‘ precontractual relationship, courts will have to identify the law that 
has the closest connection to a contemplated contract that  never came into 
existence.  In effect, courts might disregard factors like the place of injury, 
the place of conduct, and the place where the parties‘ precontractual 
relationship is centered, in favor of irrelevant factors such as the place of 
performance of the contemplated contract in order to determine the 
applicable law to claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo. 
Second, the employment of the escape clause provided by Article 4 of 
the Rome II Regulation reaches random results.  While it might reach 
favorable results in cases where the relevant contacts of both the contract 
under negotiation and of the non-contractual obligation arising out of 
dealings prior to the conclusion of the contract coincide, it will most likely 
produce inappropriate results whenever the respective relevant contacts are 
divergent. 
b.  The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Application of the Lex 
Contractus in Negotio 
While the application of the lex contractus in negotio has its 
advantages, the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation 
has one major flaw: it lacks flexibility.  Although, the European Legislature 
has allowed the parties to displace the lex contractus in negotio,323 it has 
failed to provide the courts with the necessary means to set aside its 
application whenever it reaches inappropriate results. 
i.  The Advantages Of The Application Of The Lex Contractus In Negotio 
Applying the law of the contract under negotiation to the liability that 
arises out of precontractual dealings has three benefits.  First, the 
application of the lex contractus in negotio reduces the uncertainty that 
accompanies the application of the lex delicti.  Second, it helps avoid 
unnecessary dépeçage.  Third, it affords the weaker bargaining party with 
the protection of a more protective law. 
(1)  Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio Reduces the Uncertainty 
that Accompanies the Application of the Lex Delicti 
According to section 145 of the Second Restatement on Conflict of 
 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 298–302. 
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Laws, four contacts are usually relevant in torts cases: (1) the place of the 
conduct; (2) the place of injury; (3) the place where the parties‘ relationship 
is centered; and (4) the place of residence of the parties.
324
  These contacts 
are traditionally used in order to determine the lex delicti that governs a 
non-contractual obligation.  Where the case is one of precontractual 
liability, the localization of the place of conduct, the place of injury and the 
place where the relationship is centered becomes a tedious and complex 
task that ruins the uniformity sought by the Legislature.
325
  Had the 
Legislature chosen to submit claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to 
the lex delicti, courts would be faced with the tedious task of locating the 
various torts contacts.  The application of the lex contractus in negotio in 
cases of precontractual liability reduces the uncertainty that accompanies 
the determination of such contacts,
326




(a)  The Place of Conduct 
In cases of precontractual liability, difficulties arise as to the 
localization of the conduct that causes harm.  This is the case, for example, 
whenever liability arises out of the unjustified break off of negotiations 
(Examples 3 and 4 of the Introduction).  In this case, the harmful conduct is 
the break off of negotiations.  The place of the decision to break off 
negotiations is not easy to determine whenever this decision is made by the 
defendant in one place and comes to the attention of the plaintiff in another.  
In this case, it might be argued that the harmful conduct occurs in one of 
three places: (1) the place where the defendant was first aware of his 
intention not to continue the negotiations;
328
 (2) the place where the 
defendant has dispatched his decision to break off negotiations to the 
plaintiff; or (3) the place where the plaintiff has become aware of the 
defendant‘s decision.  The same problem arises whenever liability arises out 
of the revocation of the offer by the defendant (Example 2 of the 
Introduction).  In this case, the defendant‘s decision to revoke the offer 
might have been contained in a letter that was dispatched in one place and 
received in another, while the intention to mislead the other party might 
have exteriorized in yet another forum.  In such cases, application of the lex 
contractus in negotio relieves the courts from the tedious task of locating 
the place of conduct and helps achieve uniformity between the member 
states. 
 
324 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971). 
325 See Lagarde, supra note 33, at 590. 
326 See id. 
327 Thoma, supra note 22, at 682. 
328 See Lagarde, supra note 33, at 590. 
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(b)  The Place of Injury 
The place of injury can be difficult to determine because of the type of 
injury sustained by the plaintiff.
 329
  Culpa in contrahendo can cause two 
types of injuries.  First, culpa in contrahendo can cause an economic loss to 
the plaintiff.  The Rome II Regulation excludes physical harm from the 
scope of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation.
330
  Thus, losses that usually 
arise out of precontractual liability are, in most cases, purely economic.
331
  
The place where financial loss has occurred is difficult to locate and has not 
been determined by the European Legislature.  Case law in the Member 
States does not provide a uniform solution.  Courts have decided that 
financial losses can occur in one of four places: (1) the place where the 
decision to break off negotiations was received;
332
 (2) the place where the 
contract under negotiation would have been performed had it been 
concluded;
333
 (3) the place where the non-blameworthy party acted on the 
other party‘s misstatements;
334




Second, the plaintiff might suffer harm to his reputation or to his 
image as a result of the defendant‘s conduct.  Localization of such interests 
is equally problematic
336
 as the harm might be considered to have occurred 
either at: (1) the place of residence of the plaintiff;
337
 (2) at the place where 
the plaintiff‘s reputation might be abused;
338
 or (3) wherever the plaintiff 
does business.
339
  Application of the lex contractus in negotio, allows courts 
to bypass the preliminary step of locating the place of injury and helps 
avoid complications in the determination of the applicable law that would 
have, otherwise, ruined uniformity had the Legislature chosen to submit 
claims arising out of culpa in contrahendo to the lex delicti. 
 
329 See PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 739, Lagarde, supra note 33, at 590. 
330 See supra Part I(B)(2)(a). 
331 On the type of injury arising from precontractual liability, see W. H. VAN BOOM ET 
AL., PURE ECONOMIC LOSS (2004); O. Deshayes, Le dommage précontractuel, RTD Com. 
2004 187. 
332 André Huet, Chronique de jurisprudence française, JDI 2003, 146, citing C.A. 
Rennes, Bull. Joly 1993 463; J.-J. Daigre, JCP 1993 IV 1520. 
333 Huet, supra note 332, at 146. 
334 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 524. 
335 See Global Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1999); Lang v. Paine, 
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1421 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
336 See Joseph William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal Court 
Jurisdiction in the Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996). 
337 Id. 
338 Id. 
339 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 524. 
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(c)  The Place of the Parties’ Precontractual Relationship 
Parties to a negotiation enter into a factual relationship defined by their 
negotiations.  The parties‘ precontractual relationship can be difficult to 
determine whenever negotiations are conducted in the absence of the 
physical presence of the parties: through the telephone, or via email.  This is 
especially true for the place of negotiation of the contract which can be hard 
to identify whenever the parties did not meet at the precontractual stage. 
The above-mentioned difficulties are resolved by the application of the 
lex contractus in negotio.340  Indeed, the application of the law of the 
contract under negotiation relieves courts from the burden of locating the 
various tortious contacts in international negotiations and helps achieve 




(2)  Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio Eliminates Incoherence 
by Avoiding Dépeçage342 
Application of the law of the contract under negotiation to claims of 
precontractual liability helps eliminate incoherence by avoiding dépeçage.  
According to D. Moura Vicente, ―when adjudicating a claim of 
precontractual liability involving foreign elements, a court may face certain 
incidental questions also affected by foreign elements, such as the existence 
or the validity of an international contract.‖
343
  In some cases, 
―compensation of damages arising out of culpa in contrahendo presupposes 
that the contract was either invalid or had not yet come into existence.‖
344
  
Issues relating to the existence or to the validity of the contract are, 
according to Article 10 of the Rome I Regulation, governed by the law of 
the contract if it were valid.
345
  By submitting claims arising out of culpa in 
contrahendo to the law of the contract under negotiation, the European 
Legislature has in fact submitted all issues related to the contract under 
negotiation to the same law.  In effect, when a court is confronted with the 
two issues it will rule on the existence (or on the validity) of the contract 
and on the claim for damages by applying the same law.  The application of 
two different laws to both issues might lead to unacceptable results.  This 
 
340 Lagarde, supra note 33, at 590. 
341 Cf. Thoma, supra note 22, at 682. 
342 According to Black‘s Law Dictionary, dépecage designates ―a court‘s application of 
different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-issue 
basis.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (2009). 
343 For a similar example, see Moura Vicente, supra note 16, at 718. 
344 Id. 
345 Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation states that: ―[t]he existence and validity of a 
contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it 
under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.‖  Council Regulation 593/2008, 
supra note 38, art. 10(1). 
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would be the case for example, if the law designated to govern the issue of 
precontractual liability considers that the contract under negotiation has 
been concluded, and that the defendant is exonerated from precontractual 
liability, while the law designated to govern the validity of the contract 
states that the contract has not been formed, and holds the defendant 
precontractually liable.
 346
 The implementation of dépeçage in this situation 
thwarts the interests of both States whose laws are in conflict, as well as the 
expectations of both parties.
347
 
(3)  Application of the Lex Contractus in Negotio Affords Protection to the 
Party in the Weaker Bargaining Position 
The rule of Article 12(1) enables ―the application of the [favorable] 
laws designated by Articles 6 and 8 of the Rome I Regulation‖.
348
  Because 
the law of the contract under negotiation is to be determined pursuant to the 
rules of the Rome I Regulation, ―the particular protection this instrument 
provides to certain consumer and individual employment contracts similarly 
extends to the precontractual bargaining period of the contract‖.
349
  
According to B. Volders, ―the presumed economic weaker contracting 
parties are accordingly granted legal protection also prior [to their] entering 
into a final agreement.‖
350
  Such an outcome is in accordance with national 
legislations that afford protection to the consumer or to the employee during 
the precontractual period. 
ii.  The Inflexibility of the Rule Provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II 
Regulation 
In spite of its advantages, the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the 
Rome II Regulation lacks flexibility.  The European Legislature did not 
expressly provide for any escape devices in the event the application of the 
lex contractus in negotio reaches inappropriate results.351 While the 
European Legislature might have provided escape clauses in several 
provisions of the Rome I and the Rome II Regulations, the Legislature did 
not insert an escape clause in Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation. The 
Legislature‘s silence has led to the creation of a rigid rule, which lacks 
flexibility.  On one hand, the conceptual devices employed by American 
 
346 See supra Part II(A)(2)(a)(i); see also Moura Vicente, supra note 16, at 718. 
347 See supra Part II(A)(2)(a)(i); see also Moura Vicente, supra note 16, at 718. 
348 Thoma, supra note 22, at 682; see also Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 
467; DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 534. 
349 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467. 
350 Id. 
351 It should be noted that according to Article 16 of the Rome II Regulation, the lex 
contractus in negotio can be displaced by application of the mandatory provisions of the law 
of the forum.  However, this article does not provide an escape clause that can be employed 
to displace the lex contractus in negotio every time it reaches inappropriate results. 
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courts in order to escape the egregious results of the First Restatement do 
not work in EPIL; on the other hand, the three remaining escape 
possibilities have to be borrowed from other provisions at the expense of a 
manifest disregard to the express wording of the rules. 
(1)  The Inapplicability of American Escape Devices in EPIL 
In order to escape the egregious results of the First Restatement‘s 
vested rights theory, American courts mainly employ three conceptual 
escape devices: (1) characterization; (2) renvoi; and (3) public policy.352  
While these escape devices have had success in the United States, they 
cannot be used in order to displace the lex contractus in negotio in EPIL. 
(a)  Characterization 
In order to escape the rigid rule of the lex loci delicti, American courts 
recharacterized ―the issue for decision, as a non-tort issue in order to use 
another First Restatement rule and generate a better result.‖
353
  While 
recharacterization might have yielded some good results in the United 
States, it is highly unlikely that those same results can be reached in EPIL 
where the category of culpa in contrahendo has an autonomous meaning.354  
This autonomy has been bestowed upon culpa in contrahendo for the 
specific purpose of putting an end to the characterization issue of this type 
of liability in Europe.
355
  It is highly unlikely that a European court will be 
able to recharacterize an issue of culpa in contrahendo, without any 
intervention by the ECJ. 
(b)  Renvoi 
American courts have used renvoi356 in order to apply the conflicts 
rules of a foreign law designated by one of the conflicts rules of the forum.  
Although application of renvoi has helped American courts escape some of 
the rigid rules of the First Restatement,
357
 its application is excluded by 
Article 24 of the Rome II Regulation which states that ―the application of 
the law of any country specified by this Regulation means the application of 
the rules of law in force in that country other than its rules of private 
 
352 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 309, § 65. 
353 Id.; see also Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859 (1953) (where the court used the 
substance/procedure distinction to recharacterize the issue); Haumschild v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (where the court recharacterized a torts issue into a 
status issue and applied the law of the marital domicile). 
354 See supra Part I(B). 
355 See supra Part I(B). 
356 Renvoi is defined as ―the doctrine under which a court in resorting to foreign law 
adopts as well the foreign law‘s conflict-of-laws principles, which may in turn refer the court 
back to the law of the forum.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (2009). 
357 See Haumschild, 95 N.W.2d 814. 
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  Furthermore, its application would be useless 
whenever the foreign law designated by the Rome II Regulation is the law 
of a member state that applies the conflict-of-law rule provided by Article 
12 of the Rome II Regulation. 
(c)  Public Policy 
The public policy exception is the only safeguard a Member State‘s 
court can use in order to escape the rigid rule of Article 12(1) of the Rome 
II Regulation.  Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation states that ―the 
application of a provision of the law of any country specified by this 
Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum.‖359  While 
this article provides for the application of the public policy exception, it 
also limits its application to cases where the applicable law is ―manifestly 
incompatible with the public policy of the forum.‖
360
  According to Recital 
32 of the Rome II Regulation, ―considerations of public interest justify 
giving the courts of the Member States the possibility, in exceptional 
circumstances, of applying exceptions based on public policy and 
overriding mandatory provisions.‖
361
  In other words, the setting aside of 
the applicable law for the violation of public policy of the forum is rare.  
This is especially true in civil and commercial matters such as 
precontractual liability.  It follows that the regular safeguards employed by 
American courts to counter the effects of the First Restatement do not have 
the same prophylactic effects in EPIL. 
(2)  The Inapplicability of Borrowed Escape Devices 
Because Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation does not expressly 
provide escape devices, courts of Member States might be inclined to 
borrow the escape devices provided by the European Legislature in other 
dispositions.  Specifically, courts might be inclined to borrow the escape 
devices provided by the following three articles: Article 4(3) of the Rome I 
Regulation; Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation; and Article 12(2) of the 
Rome II Regulation. 
(a)  The Escape Clause Provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation 
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation provides an escape clause that is 
applicable whenever the contract is, manifestly, more closely connected to 
 
358 See Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 24. 
359 Id. art. 26. 
360 Id. 
361 Id. at para. 32. 





  Although, this provision introduces flexibility, its 
application is restricted to the determination of the applicable law to the 
contract itself and cannot be used to determine the applicable law to the 
parties‘ precontractual relationship.363  According to Article 4(3), ―where it 
is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly 
more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in 
paragraphs 1 or 2, the law of that other country shall apply.‖
364
  The escape 
clause provided by this Article allows courts to displace the law designated 
by paragraphs 1 or 2 of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation only when the 
contract itself is manifestly more closely connected with another country.  
Such an escape device cannot be used to displace the law designated by the 
afore-mentioned paragraphs whenever the non-contractual obligation 
arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract appears to be 
more closely connected with another country.  To hold otherwise, would go 
against the wording of Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation, which clearly 




(b)  The Rule Provided by Article 10(2) of The Rome I Regulation 
Article 10(2) of the Rome I Regulation allows a party, in order to 
determine that he did not consent to the formation of the contract, to rely 
upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence if it 
appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine 
the effect of his conduct in accordance with the lex contractus, thus setting 
aside the application of the law that would normally govern the contract.
366
  
Although this provision was initially introduced to resolve the problem of 
―the implications of silence by one party as to the formation of the 
contract,‖
367
 recent scholarly writings have called for its application in order 
to prevent unfair results in cases of precontractual liability.
368
  According to 
some authors, the application of this provision might be particularly 
appropriate ―in order to provide an escape clause to the party who could not 
reasonably expect to have his precontractual behavior regulated by a law 
 
362 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art  4(3). 
363 Lagarde, supra note 33, at 593, note 39. 
364 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, at Article 4(3) (emphasis added). 
365 See id. art. 4(3). 
366 According to this article: ―[A] party, in order to establish that he did not consent, may 
rely upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence if it appears from the 
circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in 
accordance with the law specified in paragraph 1.‖  Id. art. 10(2). 
367 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 422. 
368 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467; Thoma, supra note 22, at 682; 
Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 547; Gautier, supra note 245, at  13; MAX PLANCK INST., 
COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 96. 
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  This would be the case, for example, whenever a 
defendant has relied on the law of his residence that does not impose a 
precontractual duty of good faith and fair dealings in order to put an end to 




While some scholars have argued for the application of this provision, 
the fact remains that the wording of this provision prevents its application 
to claims arising out of precontractual liability.
371
  Indeed, Article 10(2) of 
the Rome I Regulation affords protection to the party who has relied on the 
law of his residence ―in order to establish that he did not consent.‖
372
  The 
wording of this provision excludes its application whenever the party‘s aim 
is to escape liability.  We cannot assume that the Legislature intended to 
extend the application of this provision to cases of culpa in contrahendo.  
On the contrary, it is precisely because the Legislature did not expressly 
extend the application of this provision to cases of culpa in contrahendo 
that this possibility should not be open to the defendant.
373
  Indeed, Article 
10(2) of the Rome I Regulation was promulgated subsequently to Article 12 
of the Rome II Regulation.  Had the Legislature chosen to extend the 
application of this provision to cases of culpa in contrahendo he would 
have followed the example set by the Proposal of the Max Planck Institute 
for a Council Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 
and inserted an express provision authorizing the defendant to ―rely upon 
the law of the country in which he has his habitual residence to establish 
that [. . .] he was under no obligation arising from the negotiations.‖
374
  
Therefore, we cannot allow courts of member states to displace the lex 





369 Thoma, supra note 22, at 683. 
370 For examples of this situation, see Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467; 
Plender and Wilderspin, supra note 22, at 737.  See also Example 3 of the Introduction. 
371 In support of this view, see PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 737–38. 
372 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 10(2). 
373 See PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 737–38. 
374 MAX PLANCK INST., COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 114.  According to this proposal: 
[A] party may rely upon the law of the country in which he has his habitual 
residence to establish that: (a) he did not consent, or (b) that he was under no 
obligation arising from the negotiations if it appears from the circumstances that it 
would not be reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with 
the law specified in the preceding paragraphs. 
Id. 
375 Whatever view is taken, the interpretation of this provision depends ―on a normative 
reading of the provisions of the two Regulations and it will ultimately need to be tested by 
the national courts and the ECJ.‖  Thoma, supra note 22, at 683. 
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(c)  The Escape Clause Provided by Article 12(2)(c) of the Rome II 
Regulation 
Article 12(2)(c) of the Rome II Regulation provides an escape clause 
that is applicable whenever it is clear from all the circumstances of the case 
that the non-contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the 
conclusion of a contract is manifestly more closely connected with a 
country other than the country designated by paragraph 2 of this 
provision.
376
  Although this provision seems to provide an appropriate 
escape clause, its applicability is extremely limited. 
First, its applicability is limited to situations where the applicable law 
is determined according to the rules of paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation.  According to Article 12(2)(c), ―where it is clear from 
all the circumstances of the case that the non-contractual obligation arising 
out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract is manifestly more 
closely connected with a country other than that indicated in points (a) and 
(b), the law of that other country.‖
377
  It follows that this escape clause is 
not applicable whenever the law that governs culpa in contrahendo is 
determined according to paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
Second, its application is only possible whenever ―the law applicable 
cannot be determined on the basis of paragraph 1.‖
378
  This escape clause is 
only applicable whenever the lex contractus in negotio cannot be 
determined and not when the lex contractus in negotio appears to be loosely 
connected to the issue.  This escape clause cannot be used to displace the 
lex contractus in negotio whenever it reaches inappropriate results.379  To 
hold otherwise would go against the wording of Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
The lack of escape devices provided by the Legislature leads to the 
quasi-exclusive application of the lex contractus in negotio, which can 
rarely be displaced.
380
  This quasi-exclusivity is further comforted by the 
limited applicability of paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. 
B.  The Subsidiary Application of the Laws Enumerated by Article 12(2) of 
the Rome II Regulation 
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation provides subsidiary rules that 
are applicable whenever the lex contractus in negotio cannot be 
 
376 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12(2)(c). 
377 Id. 
378 Id. 
379 In support of this view, see PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 736; 
Lagarde, supra note 33, at 592–93; DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 530. 
380 Albeit through the mechanism of public policy. 
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  While this provision deviates from the application of the lex 
contractus in negotio, its application will, according to B. Volders, ―most 
probably prove superfluous in practice.‖
382
  This conclusion seems 
reasonable in light of the application requirement of Article 12(2) of the 
Rome II Regulation.  Because the lex contractus in negotio can, in the vast 
majority of cases, be identified, the subsidiary rules provided by paragraph 
2 of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation will rarely apply. 
1.  The Structure of Article 12(2) 
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation provides three different rules 
that apply ―disjunctively.‖
383
  Unlike Articles 10 and 11 of the Rome II 
Regulation with which it is usually associated,
384
  Article 12(2) ―does not 
establish a clear hierarchy of its provisions inter se.‖
385
 Because the three 
rules are joined by the coordinating conjunction ―or,‖386 a literal 
interpretation of this provision gives courts a wide discretion as to the 
choice of the relevant connecting factor.  Indeed, the three rules apply 
alternatively.  Courts have the possibility to apply the law of the place of 
injury, the law of the common residence of the parties, or the escape clause 
whenever the two previous contacts seem inappropriate. 
a.  The Application of the Law of the Place of Injury 
Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome II Regulation provides for the application 
of ―the law of the country in which the damage occurs, irrespective of the 
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and 
irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences 
of that event occurred.‖
387
  According to this provision, the law of the place 
of injury governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability.  By inserting this 
provision, the European Legislature has in fact submitted culpa in 
contrahendo to the general rule applicable to torts claims, which is provided 
by Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation.
388
  The application of the law of the 
place of injury is consistent with the non-contractual characterization of 
culpa in contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation.389  The law of the place of 
 
381 Boskovic, supra note 244, at 97; Lagarde, supra note 33, at 591; Bollée, supra note 
67, at 2164. 
382 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467. 
383 Thoma, supra note 22, at 683. 
384 Légier, supra note 63, at 145; Tubeuf, supra note 63, at 536. 
385 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 738; see also Thoma, supra note 22, at 
683. 
386 Thoma, supra note 22, at 683. 
387 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12(2). 
388 For the text of this article, see supra note 60.  For a commentary of this article, see 
Symeonides, supra note 42. 
389 On the non-contractual characterization of precontractual liability in EPIL, see supra 
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injury is the normal lex delicti applicable to non-contractual obligations.  
However, this return to normalcy can only occur whenever the lex 
contractus in negotio cannot be determined.390 
The rule provided by Article 12 (2) (a) incurs two criticisms.  First, the 
place of injury is usually difficult to determine in cases of precontractual 
liability.
391
  Although this rule provides for the application of the law of the 
place of injury ―irrespective of the country or countries in which the indirect 
consequences of that event occurred,‖
392
 this precision does not help avoid 
the difficulty of locating the place of injury.
393
 
Second, application of the lex loci damni disregards other relevant 
contacts like the place of the conduct or the place of residence of the parties 
and might lead to unfair results which American courts have long sought to 
avoid.
394
  However, this unwanted result can be avoided because Article 
12(2) of the Rome II Regulation provides flexibility and allows the 
application of another law whenever application of the lex loci damni 
reaches inappropriate results. 
b.  The Application of the Law of the Parties‘ Common Residence 
Article 12(2)(b) of the Rome II Regulation states that ―where the 
parties have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when 
the event giving rise to the damage occurs, the law of that country‖
395
 
should govern the defendant‘s precontractual liability.  According to this 
provision, the law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability is the 
law of the common residence of the parties at the time of the conduct.
396
  
This law would still apply whenever the parties have changed residences 
between the time when culpa in contrahendo arose and the time when the 
injury has manifested itself. 
The Legislature has chosen as a relevant date for a habitual residence 
the time when the event giving rise to the damage occurs.  This provision 
deviates from the general rule provided by Article 4(2) of the Rome II 
Regulation, which requires that all parties have their habitual residence in 
the same country at the time when the damage occurs.397 
 
Part I. 
390 And the parties did not have their habitual residence in the same country at the time of 
conduct.  See infra Part II(B)(2). 
391 See supra Part II(A)(2)(b)(i)(1). 
392 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12(2)(a). 
393 See supra Part II(A)(2)(b). 
394 For a commentary of this rule see Symeonides, supra note 42. 
395 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12(2)(b). 
396 For criticism of this rule, see Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 468. 
397 Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation states ―where the person claimed to be liable 
and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at 
the time when the damage occurs, the law of that country shall apply.‖  Council Regulation 
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It is unclear why the Legislature has chosen to depart from the general 
rule he has established in Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation.
398
  This 
change in the wording of Article 12(2)(b) does not address the difficulty of 
determining the relevant contacts in cases of culpa in contrahendo. While it 
is true that it is difficult to determine the exact time of injury in cases of 
precontractual liability,
399
 ―it is, however, wrong to assume that the exact 
time of the event giving rise to the damage is easier to determine.‖
400
 
However, it may be argued that this rule reaches more suitable results 
than the rule provided by Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation whenever 
the parties have changed residences between the time when the event giving 
rise to the damage has occurred and the time when the injury has 
manifested itself.  This is especially true whenever the law of the habitual 
place of residence at the time of conduct is more favorable to the party who 
has moved out between the time when the event giving raise to the damage 
occurs and the time when the injury arises, than the law of his place of 
residence at the time of injury.  In this particular scenario, the party that has 
moved out of the state of the habitual residence has a right to rely on this 
law‘s provisions, while the other party has no right to rely on the more 
favorable law of a state whose application he could not foresee at the time 
of conduct.  The parties are expected to have relied on the law of their 
common residence at the time they enter into negotiations.  Although an 
argument can be made as to the suitability of this rule, we cannot assume it 
reaches appropriate results every time the parties have a common habitual 
place of residence at the time of conduct.  This is why the European 
Legislature has provided an escape clause in Article 12(2)(c) of the Rome II 
Regulation. 
c.  The Escape Clause 
Article 12(2)(c) of the Rome II Regulation provides an escape clause 
whenever the applicable law according to Articles 12(2)(a) and 12(2)(b) of 
the Rome II Regulation is inappropriate.  According to Article 12(2)(c) 
where it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the non-
contractual obligation arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion 
of a contract is manifestly more closely connected with a country 




This text allows for the determination of the applicable law on an ad hoc 
 
864/2007, supra note 37, art. 4(2). 
398 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 468. 
399 See supra Part II(B)(2)(a). 
400 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 468.  See supra Part II(B)(2)(a). 
401 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, art. 12(2)(c). 
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basis each time the applicable law according to the previous two provisions 
of Article 12(2) is inappropriate.
402
  The escape clause provided by Article 
12(2) of the Rome II Regulation is worded in similar fashion to the escape 
clause provided by Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation.
403
 As such, it is 
subject to the same type of criticism: namely, that ―it entails the risk of 
degenerating into a mechanical counting of physical contacts.‖
404
  However, 
―this risk is reduced when the escape is correlated to the overarching 
principles that permeate the rules, and/or when the escape allows an issue-
by-issue evaluation.‖
405
  It would seem that the wording of this provision 
allows for such an optimal employment of the escape clause.  However, 
although this escape clause helps bring flexibility to the rigid rules of 
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation, its application can prove to be 
relatively rare in practice. 
2.  The Application Requirement of Article 12(2) 
Article 12(2) of the Rome II Regulation is only applicable whenever 
the law that governs the defendant‘s precontractual liability cannot be 
determined on the basis of Article 12(1) of the same Regulation.  By 
inserting a second paragraph in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation, the 
Legislature did not intend to provide courts with an escape device that 
allows the application of a more appropriate rule whenever the lex 
contractus in negotio leads to unwanted results.  Article 12(2) of the Rome 
II Regulation serves as an alternative whenever it is impossible to determine 
the lex contractus in negotio on the basis of Article 12(1).  In effect, courts 
are not allowed to use the escape clause provided by Article 12(2)(c) in 




―The circumstances in which the law cannot be determined in 
accordance Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation are not addressed in the 
provision‖.
407
 The Legislature‘s silence might prove to be a source of 
disruption as it might reintroduce diversity where the Legislature has sought 
to achieve uniformity.  The application of this provision might entirely 
depend on the inclination of the judge dealing with a liability claim arising 
out of culpa in contrahendo.  A court that favors the rule of Article 12(1) of 
the Rome II Regulation will likely find sufficiently determined contacts in a 
situation where another court, which favors the application of Article 12(2) 
of the same Regulation, would find them insufficient. 
 
402 Thoma, supra note 22, at 684. 
403 See supra note 60. 
404 Symeonides, supra note 42, at 197. 
405 Id. 
406 PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 736; Lagarde supra note 33, at 593. 
407 Thoma, supra note 22, at 683. 
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Additionally, it would seem that the law that governs the defendant‘s 
precontractual liability can, in the vast majority of cases, be determined on 
the basis of Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation, thus rendering the 
second paragraph of the same Article rarely applicable.
408
 
On one hand, whenever culpa in contrahendo has not prevented the 
formation of the contract,
409
 the law of the contract under negotiation is the 
lex contractus finalis which is, in the vast majority of cases, always 
determinable.
410
  The concluded contract either contains a choice of law 
clause or allows the determination of the relevant contacts provided by 
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation.
411
  Even in situations where the 
applicable law cannot be determined on the basis of Articles 4(1) and 4(2) 
of the Rome I Regulation, courts can, in the vast majority of cases, 
determine the lex contractus finalis on the basis of the escape clause 
provided by Article 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation.
412
 However, an issue 
might arise whenever the parties have decided to submit different parts of 
the contract to different laws.
413
  It might be argued that in such a case the 
lex contractus finalis cannot be determined on the basis of Article 12(1) of 
the Rome II Regulation and that the defendant‘s precontractual liability is 




On the other hand, whenever culpa in contrahendo has prevented the 
formation of the contract under negotiation,
415
 the lex contractus putativus 
is determinable on the basis of Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation, or on the basis of Article 4(4) of the same Regulation.
416
 
First, the lex contractus putativus is, in most cases, determinable on 
the basis of Articles 4(1) and 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation.
417
  Indeed, 
whenever parties enter into a negotiation, three contacts are already 
determined: both parties‘ places of residence and the subject matter of the 
contract.  In most cases, this information helps determine the place of the 
habitual residence of the debtor of the characteristic performance, whose 
 
408 In support of this view, see Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467; Bollée, 
supra note 67; Légier, supra note 63, at 166; PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 
738; Lagarde, supra note 33, at 593.  Contra, Thoma, supra note 22, at 68.  The author 
provides a list of examples where the lex contractus in negotio cannot be determined. 
409 In this case culpa in contrahendo has either provoked the formation of the contract or 
has altered some of its terms. 
410 DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 535. 
411 See supra Part II(A)(1)(a). 
412 DICKINSON, supra note 48, at 535. 
413 See supra Part II(A)(1)(a). 
414 See supra Part II, A, 1. 
415 See supra Part I(B)(2). 
416 In support of this view, see Bollée, supra note 67, at 2164. 
417 Id. 
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law is usually applicable to the contemplated contract.
418
 It should be noted, 
however, that some scholars have argued that a ―breakdown of negotiations 
at the very beginning [might] hinder the determination of the applicable law 
to the projected agreement, especially if the projected agreement were to be 
very complex.‖
419
  This might be the case, for example, in complex mergers 
where the debtor of the characteristic performance of the projected merger 
cannot be accurately determined at the start of negotiations.
420
 
Alternatively, and even if the lex contractus putativus cannot be 
determined on the basis of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 4 of the Rome I 
Regulation, this law can be determined on the basis of Article 4(4) of the 
same Regulation.
421
  Indeed, Article 4(4) provides the courts with a 
subsidiary rule that allows the application of the law with the closest 
connection to the contract whenever the rules provided by the previous 
paragraphs do not allow the determination of the applicable law.
422
 By 
employment of this escape clause, a court will be able to force the 
localization of the country with the closest connection to the putative 
contract. In effect, the lex contractus in negotio is, in the vast majority of 




Whatever view is taken as to the determination of the lex contractus in 
negotio, it all depends on whether the courts will be willing to displace the 
rule of Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation.  A court that favors the rule 
of Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation will likely find sufficiently 
determined contacts in a situation where another court, which favors the 
application of Article 12(2) of the same Regulation, would find them 
insufficient. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it would seem that Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation 
will have mitigated success.  This essay has tried to show the positives as 
well as the negatives of the Legislature‘s attempt at codification. 
 
418 Id. 
419 Volders, First Appraisal, supra note 49, at 467, 134; Lagarde, supra note 33, at 593; 
PLENDER AND WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 736. 
420 In some instances, the target company can only be determined after lengthy 
negotiations that involve economic, financial, and fiscal studies.  In such cases, it is hard to 
identify the debtor of the characteristic performance. Other examples have also been 
advanced. According to Plender and Wilderspin, ―in very complex contracts such as joint 
ventures, or negotiations involving a large number of parties, it may not be possible to 
determine the applicable law of the putative contract, even if the negotiations are advanced.‖  
PLENDER & WILDERSPIN, supra note 22, at 736. 
421 Bollée, supra note 67, at 2164. 
422 See supra Part II(A)(1). 
423 Bollée, supra note 67, at 2164. 
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A.  The Positives 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation reaches two positive results.  
First, this provision has succeeded in reaching a uniform characterization of 
culpa in contrahendo in EPIL.  Although the issue of the applicable law to 
the precontractual liability arising out of the breach of a contractual 
obligation remains unresolved, the contours of the category of culpa in 
contrahendo in EPIL are determined without regard to national 
characterization. 
Second, the Legislature‘s choice to submit claims arising out of culpa 
in contrahendo to the lex contractus in negotio is laudable.  The application 
of this law reduces the uncertainty that accompanies the application of the 
lex delicti in a situation involving precontractual liability.  Furthermore, it 
avoids unwanted results whenever the validity of the contract under 
negotiations affects the defendant‘s precontractual liability. 
B.  The Negatives 
The European Legislature‘s attempt at codification of a choice of law 
rule on culpa in contrahendo reaches six negative results. 
First, the Legislature‘s use of vague concepts, such as ―non-contractual 
obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract‖ and 
―non-contractual obligations presenting a direct link with the dealings prior 
to the conclusion of a contract,‖ in order to define the material scope of 
Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation are likely to reintroduce diversity 
where the Legislature has sought to achieve uniformity.  In effect, courts of 
Member States will likely interpret these concepts according to national 
laws, which will ruin the uniformity achieved at the legislation stage. 
Second, the Legislature did not provide guidelines as to the applicable 
law to precontractual liability that arises out of the breach of a contractual 
obligation.  The Legislature‘s silence might prove to be a source of 
confusion whenever a Member State‘s court is confronted with a claim 
arising out of the breach of a preliminary agreement. 
Third, the application of the lex contractus in negotio has ruined the 
uniformity between the European Regulations on Private International Law 
reached by the Legislature at the characterization stage.  Indeed, culpa in 
contrahendo is characterized in EPIL as non-contractual for the purposes of 
choice of law and of choice of jurisdiction.  However, the Brussels I 
Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters does not provide a special rule 
for the choice of jurisdiction in matters relating to culpa in contrahendo.424  
Therefore, the competent jurisdiction in a case of culpa in contrahendo is 
determined according to the tortious contacts provided by Article 5(3) of 
 
424 Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 84. 
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the Brussels I Regulation.  Thus, the court, whose jurisdiction is established 
on the basis of a non-contractual connecting factor, will have to apply a law 
that is determined on the basis of a contractual connecting factor, which 
does not always coincide with the law of the forum. 
Fourth, the determination of the lex contractus in negotio might prove 
to be a delicate issue.  This is especially true whenever the parties have 
chosen to submit different parts of their concluded contract to different 
laws.  Complications may also arise whenever the contract under 
negotiation has not been concluded.  In this situation, the determination of 
the applicable law hinges on the contacts provided by the parties‘ 
contractual project which might create additional problems as to the proof 
of the contents of such a project. 
Fifth, the rule provided by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation 
lacks flexibility.  The lack of escape devices in Article 12 of the Rome II 
Regulation make for a rigid rule that might be inappropriate in certain 
situations. 
Sixth, paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation only 
applies whenever the applicable law cannot be determined on the basis of 
Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation.  However, the Legislature did not 
provide a list of circumstances in which the law cannot be determined on 
the basis of Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation.  The Legislature‘s 
silence might reintroduce diversity where the Legislature has aimed for 
uniformity.  The application of this provision will most likely depend on the 
inclination of each court.  Moreover, it would appear that, in the vast 
majority of cases, the lex contractus in negotio can be determined, thus 
rendering the application of Article 12(2) relatively rare in practice. 
The positive as well as the negative results that stem from the 
application of Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation are better illustrated by 
its application to the examples mentioned in the introduction.
425
 
Example 1: In this example, the contract has already been concluded, 
thus the issue of the defendant‘s precontractual liability is governed by the 
lex contractus finalis.  In this case, the parties did not include in their 
contract a choice of law clause.  Therefore, the lex contractus finalis is to be 
determined according to Article 4(1) of the Rome I Regulation.
426
  The 
defendant‘s precontractual liability is governed by U.S. law, which is the 
law of the habitual residence of the seller.
427
 
In this situation, Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation reaches a 
positive result.  Indeed, the United States have a strong interest in 
protecting its residents from liability arising out of the failure to disclose 
 
425 See supra Introduction. 
426 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(1). 
427 Although a strong argument can be made for the application of French or German 
law. 
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during the negotiations of a contract.  It also has an interest in liberating the 
parties‘ conduct at the negotiation stage in order to encourage commercial 
initiatives.  It is also the law of the debtor of the characteristic performance 
whose application is, arguably, foreseeable to the plaintiff.  In addition, this 
situation raises the issue of the validity of the concluded contract, in which 
case the application of the lex contractus in negotio reaches favorable 
results. 
Example 2: In this example, there are two issues that need to be 
addressed. The first issue is the existence of the contract. According to 
Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation, ―the existence and validity of a 
contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which 
would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid.‖
428
 
It follows that the law that governs the existence of the contract is 
determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation and is the law 
of the habitual residence of the seller of shares. It follows that the existence 
of the contract is governed by French law, which considers that the 
revocation of the offer prevents the formation of the contract.
429
 The second 
issue is the defendant‘s precontractual liability. Because the applicable law 
to the existence of the contract considers that the revocation of the offer has 
prevented the formation of the contract, the defendant‘s precontractual 
liability is to be governed by the lex contractus putativus.  This law is also 
determined on the basis of Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation and is the law 
of the habitual residence of the seller of shares. It follows that the issue of 
defendant‘s precontractual liability is also governed by French law, which 




In this example, the issues of the existence of the contract and of the 
defendant‘s precontractual liability are intertwined. Application of Article 
12 of the Rome II Regulation reaches a positive result by submitting the 
two issues to the same law, and avoids unnecessary dépeçage in order to 
achieve a coherent result.
431
 
Example 3: In this example, the contract for the sale of goods has not 
been concluded, thus, the issue of the defendant‘s precontractual liability is 
to be governed by the lex contractus putativus, which is the law of the 
habitual residence of the seller.  Application of the rule provided by Article 
12(1) of the Rome II Regulation leads to the application of French law to 
the defendant‘s precontractual liability.  This result has mitigated success.  
While it may be argued that the lex contractus in negotio is appropriate in 
order to resolve a true conflict situation, one may argue that the application 
 
428 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 10(1). 
429 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
430 See id. 
431 See supra Part II(A)(2)(a)(i). 
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of French law in this situation is ―neither fair nor efficient as it creates legal 




Example 4: In this example, the contract for the sale of land has not 
been concluded.  Thus, the issue of the defendant‘s precontractual liability 
is to be governed by the lex contractus putativus.  Because the parties‘ 
contemplated contract is a contract for the sale of land, this law is 
determined on the basis of Article 4(1)(c) of the Rome I Regulation and is 
the ―law of the country where the property is situated.‖
433
  Thus, according 




The result reached by Article 12(1) of the Rome II Regulation is 
inappropriate and should be avoided.
435
  However, Article 12 of the Rome 
II Regulation does not expressly provide the courts with appropriate escape 
devices that would allow them to displace the lex contractus in negotio in 
order to reach more appropriate results. 
In light of this appraisal, it would seem appropriate to suggest that the 
Commission‘s report on the application of the Rome II Regulation, 
scheduled to be submitted to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee in 2012, include the following: 
i.  A definition of the concept of non-contractual obligations, in 
general, and more specifically, a definition of the concept of non-
contractual obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion 
of a contract; 
ii.  The determination of the material scope of Article 12 of the 
Rome II Regulation.  The Commission‘s report should address, in 
particular, the issue of the applicable law to preliminary agreements 
and pollicitation; 
iii.  The circumstances in which the lex contractus in negotio cannot 
be determined, which would trigger the application of Article 12(2) 
of the Rome II Regulation; and 
iv.  The proposal to include an escape clause that allows the courts to 
displace the lex contractus in negotio whenever its application 
reaches inappropriate results. It should be noted that the inclusion of 
an escape clause in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation does not 
contradict the Legislature‘s aim of achieving uniformity between the 
different member states.  Likewise, the need for legal certainty does 
not justify the lack of an escape clause in Article 12(1) of the Rome 
 
432 Thoma, supra note 22, at 682.  See also supra Part II(A)(2)(a). 
433 Council Regulation 593/2008, supra note 38, art. 4(1). 
434 Banakas, supra note 16; Musy, supra note 16. 
435 See supra Part II(A)(2)(a). 
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II Regulation.  Indeed, the European Legislature has inserted escape 
clauses in several provisions of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations 
in order to introduce flexibility and allow ―the court seized to treat 
individual cases in an appropriate manner.‖
436
  No reason should 
preclude the Legislature from providing an appropriate escape clause 
that allows departure from the application of the lex contractus in 
negotio. 
While it can be presumptuous to hope that all the issues addressed in 
the present essay will be resolved by the end of 2012, we hope that the 
Commission‘s report will at least identify the most glaring shortcomings of 
the rule provided by Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. 
 
436 Council Regulation 864/2007, supra note 37, para. 14. 
